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ABSTRACT 
 Acceleration has long fascinated managers. Their captivation is reflected in a 
century of popular business strategies designed to speed up work, including “scientific 
management,” “lean production,” and “lean startup”. Scholars have paid significant 
attention to acceleration, examining the effects of greater speed on numerous work 
outcomes (e.g., decisions, new product success) as well as work processes (e.g., 
information processing, consideration of alternatives). Despite this relatively robust 
literature, there are two areas where our knowledge of acceleration is still limited. First, 
we lack knowledge about the varied ways in which organizations enact acceleration; prior 
research has focused on the use of deadlines to speed up task completion, with little 
consideration of other approaches. Second, because previous studies have yielded 
conflicting results regarding the implications of acceleration, it remains unclear exactly 
how an emphasis on increasing speed shapes people’s experiences and work. To advance 
theorizing in these two areas, I conducted an ethnographic study of a seed accelerator 
(“InnoTech”), a relatively new form of organization that runs time-limited programs with 
the explicit intent of speeding up the process of venture creation. Through an inductive, 
	  	   ix	  
grounded analysis, I found that InnoTech mandated acceleration through a broad set of 
tactics that included, but was not limited to, the imposition of deadlines. These tactics 
were rooted in InnoTech’s localized conceptualization of acceleration: securing funding 
faster. I also found that InnoTech created both time-based (i.e., temporal) and event-
based (i.e., sequential) triggers for beginning fundraising. Some of the entrepreneurs 
participating in InnoTech’s program perceived these triggers as compatible, and thus felt 
a sense of synchrony. Other entrepreneurs perceived the triggers as incompatible, and 
thus experienced a sense of asynchrony. The entrepreneurs’ differing perceptions had 
important implications for their experiences and work. By building theory about localized 
approaches to acceleration, and how they may shape people’s responses in varying ways, 
I suggest that speed is a situated phenomenon that must be understood as such. My 
research contributes to the literatures on acceleration, pacing, deadlines, and time as a 
form of control in organizations. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Over the past fifteen years, organizational scholars have urged researchers to pay 
greater attention to time (Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001; Ancona, 
Okhuysen, & Perlow, 2001; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2012; Sonnentag, 2012; van den Scott, 
2014). Their appeals reflect the growing recognition that the temporal elements of 
organizations are as fundamental to work as are the cultural, political, and strategic 
aspects (Ancona, Goodman, et al., 2001; Dubinskas, 1988a). Adopting a temporal lens 
enables researchers to explore a myriad of phenomena that otherwise fade into the 
background, such as pacing (Ancona, Goodman, et al., 2001; Gersick, 1988, 1994), the 
sequencing or order of events (Albert, 2013; Ancona, Okhuysen, et al., 2001; Zerubavel, 
1981), and norms about availability (Mazmanian, 2013; Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & 
Yates, 2013; Perlow, 1999). 
Although scholars continue to highlight areas of neglect in the literature on time 
(Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2012; Roe, 2009; Shipp & Cole, 2015), there is one temporal 
phenomenon that has attracted interest from generations of researchers: speed. Spanning 
early studies of manufacturing productivity (Taylor, 1911), subsequent studies on group 
task performance (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Gersick, 1988, 1989), and more recent 
investigations of firm decision making (e.g., Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning, 2002) and 
market timing (e.g., Suarez, Grodal, & Gotsopoulos, 2015), speed has long intrigued 
scholars. In particular, researchers have been fascinated by organizations’ efforts to 
increase speed. This academic interest in acceleration mirrors longstanding popular 
captivation, which is evident in numerous business strategies designed to speed up work, 
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including “scientific management” (Taylor, 1911), “lean production” (Womack, Jones, & 
Roos, 1990), and “lean startup” (Ries, 2011). 
Despite continued interest in the subject of acceleration, our understanding of this 
phenomenon in organizations is limited in two key areas. First, we lack knowledge about 
the varied ways in which organizations enact acceleration. A core literature on deadlines 
(e.g., Blount, Waller, & Leroy, 2005; Gersick, 1988, 1989; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; 
Waller, Zellmer-Bruhn, & Giambatista, 2002)—which links to theories of temporal 
pacing (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Ancona & Waller, 2007; Gersick, 1994) and time 
pressure (Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996; Andrews & Farris, 1972; 
McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Moore & Tenney, 2012)—offers crucial insights into the use of 
time limits. However, few researchers have looked beyond deadlines to illuminate other 
important acceleration tactics. In addition, with a few notable exceptions (c.f., Perlow, 
1998, 1999), researchers have studied individual acceleration tactics in isolation (e.g., 
deadlines, norms), rather than examining the broad set of tactics that organizations 
employ, in concert, to increase speed. Finally, scholars have generally viewed 
acceleration as if it were an undifferentiated phenomenon, without considering how it 
may have different meanings and applications depending on the specific setting. 
Second, it remains unclear exactly how organizational attempts to increase speed 
shape people’s experiences and work. This is because prior research has yielded 
conflicting findings about the effects of acceleration (Perlow et al., 2002): whereas some 
scholars contend that an emphasis on greater speed generates positive feelings (Gersick, 
1989; Locke & Latham, 2002; Locke, Shaw, Saari, & Latham, 1981), others argue that a 
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focus on acceleration sparks negative emotions (e.g., stress, anxiety) (McGrath & 
Rotchford, 1983; Nicholson, 2000; Williams & Alliger, 1994). Similarly, although some 
scholars suggest that increasing speed improves work outcomes (e.g., Andrews & Farris, 
1972; Eisenhardt, 1989; Gersick, 1988, 1989), others believe that moving faster is 
detrimental to performance (e.g., Amabile, Hadley, & Kramer, 2002; Crawford, 1992; 
Lukas, Menon, & Bell, 2002; Perlow et al., 2002). Finally, scholars (e.g., Beeftink, 2008; 
Blount et al., 2005; Bowden, 1985; Crawford, 1992; Eisenhardt, 1989; Gersick, 1988, 
1989; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Lukas et al., 2002) have offered opposing viewpoints 
regarding whether acceleration improves or impairs work processes, such as information 
processing, consideration of alternatives, and strategic shifts.  
 In this dissertation, I seek to enrich understanding of acceleration in organizations. 
I entered the field motivated by a broad research question: what happens when 
organizations seek to accelerate their members’ work? However, as I immersed myself 
in and learned more about my research setting, two more specific research questions 
emerged: how do organizations pursue acceleration? and how does an organization’s 
approach to acceleration shape its members’ experiences and work? These two core 
questions became my guideposts as I moved from data collection, to data analysis, and 
then to theorizing.  
Before reviewing prior research and theory in greater detail, I provide definitions 
for several key terms. I then summarize the relevant extant literature on acceleration. 
Finally, I offer a brief outline of the chapters that comprise this dissertation. 
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
 There are a number of terms that I use in this dissertation that require definition 
for the sake of precision and clarity. In particular, it is important to understand the 
distinction between speed and accelerate. Speed refers to “the rate at which something 
happens or is done” (“Speed,” 2012). Thus—contrary to popular and some scholarly 
usage (e.g., Perlow et al., 2002)—speed does not imply a specific type of rate, but rather 
is a word that describes rate (i.e., pace), which might be faster or slower. In contrast to 
the broader term speed, accelerate implies a particular type of pace: one that is faster. 
More specifically, accelerate means to speed up, or “to cause something to happen 
sooner or more quickly” (“Accelerate,” 2012).  
 These definitions help anchor my research, making it clearer that I am studying 
acceleration, which implies a specific type of speed. In other words, my overarching 
research question—i.e., what happens when organizations seek to accelerate their 
members’ work?—signals that I am interested in organizational efforts to elicit greater 
speed. As I discuss in the Conclusion (Chapter 5), however, my findings about 
acceleration may also be relevant to our understanding of attempts to decelerate, or slow 
down, the pace of work.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: ACCELERATION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
In the sections below, I summarize the literature that I draw and build on in this 
dissertation. This discussion is organized according to my two key research questions.  
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Organizational Approaches to Acceleration 
 As stated above, one of the key research questions that I sought to answer in this 
dissertation was: how do organizations pursue acceleration? Prior research has focused 
primarily on organizations’ attempts to accelerate work through the imposition of 
deadlines. This literature has generally considered deadlines as standalone acceleration 
tactics. However, a few studies have revealed that organizations may incorporate a 
broader range of tactics. 
Deadlines as an acceleration tactic. Although organizations employ deadlines to 
achieve a number of different organizational objectives (e.g., better coordination of 
interdependent work, increased predictability), managers often use deadlines with the 
goal of accelerating work outcomes (Andrews & Farris, 1972; Baldamas, 1961; McGrath 
& Rotchford, 1983; Perlow et al., 2002). Scholars have proposed two main mechanisms 
to explain why deadlines should foster greater speed: time pressure and temporal pacing. 
First, deadlines create a sense of time pressure (Amabile et al., 1996; Andrews & Farris, 
1972; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Moore & Tenney, 2012), or a feeling that there is a 
limited amount of time available to complete a particular task, activity, or project (Pfeffer 
& DeVoe, 2012). This pressure is thought to motivate people, so that they invest greater 
effort and/or time in order to meet an imposed deadline (Latham & Locke, 1975; Locke 
et al., 1981; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Moore & Tenney, 2012; Seers & Woodruff, 1997).  
Second, deadlines are believed to influence how and when people do their work, 
through a phenomenon called temporal pacing (Gersick, 1994): people pay increasing 
attention to time as a deadline nears, and adapt their efforts in order to complete their 
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work by that deadline (Gersick, 1988, 1989; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Lim & Murnighan, 
1994; Moore & Tenney, 2012; Okhuysen, 2001; Parks & Cowlin, 1995; Waller et al., 
2002). As Gersick noted in her foundational study of deadlines and temporal pacing, 
group members become more aware of the clock as their allotted time dwindles, and this 
awareness “stimulates them to compare where they are with where they need to be and to 
adjust their progress accordingly” (1998: 34). They may adjust by working additional 
hours (e.g., DeVoe & Pfeffer, 2007; Perlow, 1998) or by increasing the intensity (i.e., 
pace) of their work (Ancona, Okhuysen, et al., 2001; Latham & Locke, 1975; Lim & 
Murnighan, 1994).  
The concept of temporal pacing is rooted in entrainment theory. In biology, where 
it was developed, entrainment theory describes the relatively automatic and unconscious 
“syncing” of physiological processes with naturally-occurring rhythms in the 
environment (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983). For instance, humans (as well as animals) 
adapt their sleep/wake cycles to align with the rhythm of the earth’s rotation, which takes 
approximately twenty-four hours. When applied to organizations, entrainment theory 
suggests that work behavior comes to be “in sync” with temporal pacers (Ancona & 
Chong, 1996; Ancona & Waller, 2007), or time-based triggers (Gersick, 1994), present in 
the workplace (Ancona, Okhuysen, et al., 2001; Gersick, 1988, 1989; Labianca, Moon, & 
Watt, 2005; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; McGrath, Kelly, & Machatka, 1984; McGrath & 
Rotchford, 1983). Deadlines serve as temporal pacers; although imposed by managers, 
they tend to be tied to rhythms in an organization, group, or individual’s environment. 
For instance, managers may set a product launch deadline to align with the timing of an 
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annual industry conference. Similarly, managers may require that employees submit 
financial reports in advance of the annual U.S. federal tax cutoff date of April 15th.  
Additional types of acceleration tactics. In contrast to the relatively large 
literature on deadlines, only a handful of scholars have considered additional tactics that 
organizations may use to accelerate work. Near the start of the twentieth century, Taylor 
(1911) applied scientific principles to understand and improve labor efficiency in 
manufacturing. By examining workers’ movements in great detail, and identifying the 
most efficient procedures, he sought to increase the rate at which factories manufactured 
their products. Echoes of Taylor’s tactics, termed “scientific management,” are present in 
many contemporary management practices and philosophies, such as “lean production” 
(Womack et al., 1990) and “lean startup” (Ries, 2011). 
More recently, scholars have considered acceleration tactics in organizations 
engaged in knowledge work. Their research has identified a range of relatively subtle 
tactics—such as scheduling, assignments, policies, incentives, and norms—that 
organizations use to get their members to work longer hours, despite their supposed 
flexible schedules, so that they complete tasks and projects more quickly. Perlow (1998) 
found that managers controlled when and how much software engineers worked by 
scheduling meetings at particular times, requesting additional tasks, restricting vacations, 
requiring training courses, asking for progress reports, and monitoring who was present 
in the office. Perlow (1999) also observed that managers rewarded “high-visibility work”, 
which meant working long hours to deal with time-consuming crises quickly, as they 
arose. In their study of a call center, Fleming and Spicer found that managers created 
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“everyday norms and expectations regarding the time and effort (employees) must devote 
to the company, often involving unwanted overtime or weekend work” (2004: 83). 
Finally, Casey (1995) showed how an electronics company established norms that 
defined “high commitment” in terms of working long hours. 
Researchers have also found that organizations draw on knowledge workers’ 
conceptions of themselves to elicit longer work hours. Based on a study of highly-skilled 
workers in Silicon Valley, Shih (2004) noted that managers encouraged evening and 
weekend work “through the normative, individualist ideology in the region that interprets 
the worker as an entrepreneur who can ultimately achieve success (and untold 
riches)…through their own active efforts” (233). Similarly, Kunda (1992) found that a 
high-technology firm pushed its members to think of themselves as employees at all 
times, so that they would devote more time to their work.  
The field studies summarized above underscore that organizations differ not only 
in terms of the tactics they employ to elicit greater speed, but also in terms of their 
fundamental assumptions about the meaning of acceleration. Unlike laboratory studies, 
wherein scholars typically define acceleration a priori—usually in terms of imposing 
time limits on discrete tasks (e.g., Gersick, 1989; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Waller et al., 
2002)—field studies offer insights into the varied ways in which organizations may 
approach acceleration. For instance, this prior research demonstrates that acceleration 
may be viewed in terms of eliciting longer hours from employees (Casey, 1995; Fleming 
& Spicer, 2004; Kunda, 1992; Perlow, 1998; Shih, 2004) or in terms of coping quickly 
with emergent crises (Perlow, 1999). In sum, these studies highlight that acceleration is 
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not a monolithic phenomenon. Rather, it is a concept that may be interpreted and 
implemented differently depending on the specific setting. 
 
Implications of Acceleration for Experiences and Work 
My second key research question was: how does an organization’s approach to 
acceleration shape its members’ experiences and work? There is a considerable literature 
that examines how the organizational pursuit of acceleration shapes people’s experiences, 
work outcomes, and work processes.  
Experience. A small body of theory and research offers insights into the 
implications of acceleration for members’ experiences. This literature is somewhat 
discordant in its conclusions. On one hand, some scholars have argued that time pressure 
(Amabile et al., 1996; Andrews & Farris, 1972; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; Moore & 
Tenney, 2012) increases positive feelings of motivation. These researchers suggest that 
deadlines stimulate motivation by acting as goals towards which people wish to strive 
(Gersick, 1989; Locke & Latham, 2002; Locke et al., 1981). On the other hand, other 
scholars contend that attempts to accelerate work generate negative emotions, such as 
stress and anxiety, because people worry they will not be able to complete their work 
quickly enough to satisfy imposed time constraints (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983; 
Nicholson, 2000; Williams & Alliger, 1994). These researchers further propose that time 
pressure inhibits people’s experiences of flow (Mainemelis, 2001), defined as a sense of 
total absorption, enjoyment, and engagement (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). 
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Work outcomes. The literature on acceleration also offers conflicting evidence 
regarding performance outcomes (Perlow et al., 2002). At the individual and group level, 
scholars have linked greater speed to both positive and negative influences on creativity. 
Whereas Andrews and Farris (1972) found that applying time pressure led to greater 
innovation, other scholars have concluded that imposing time constraints inhibits 
creativity (Amabile, Hadley, et al., 2002; Andrews & Smith, 1996; Kelly & Karau, 1993). 
In line with this latter set of empirical studies, scholars have made conceptual arguments 
that acceleration results in “trivial” rather than “breakthrough” innovation (Crawford, 
1992) and diminishes people’s abilities to be creative (Mainemelis, 2001). Research on 
the relationship between acceleration and individual/group decision-making has produced 
similarly mixed results. Although Eisenhardt and her colleagues (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 
1988; 1989) found that teams made superior decisions when they acted more quickly, 
other scholars have concluded that acceleration results in suboptimal choices (Blount et 
al., 2005; Payne, Bettman, & Luce, 1996; Perlow et al., 2002). 
The extant literature at the firm level is also characterized by disagreement: some 
studies indicate that greater speed enhances company performance, while others suggest 
that it hampers performance. Strategy scholars initially proposed that reaching the market 
quickly increased economic success (Ittner & Larcker, 1997; Kessler & Bierly, 2002; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). However, entering the market sooner—especially 
first—is now believed to be a potential disadvantage, since “first movers” often incur 
higher costs of innovation, face greater market uncertainty and disorganization, and often 
become reliant on older technologies (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Suarez et al., 
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2015; Teece, 1986). Furthermore, an emphasis on rapid movement has been linked to 
lower quality products (Chen, Reilly, & Lynn, 2012; Crawford, 1992; Lukas et al., 2002) 
as well as poorly developed firm strategies (Perlow et al., 2002). 
Work processes. Previous research on how acceleration shapes work processes 
offers insights into the mechanisms underlying the varied work outcomes discussed 
above. However, this body of literature is also relatively incoherent: scholars offer 
differing perspectives on the ways in which acceleration influences information 
processing, consideration of alternatives, and strategic shifts. First, some studies suggest 
that speed limits inhibit information processing (Moore & Tenney, 2012), to the 
detriment of outcomes such as quality and creativity. Andrew and Smith (1996) found 
that managers coped with time pressure by resorting to heuristics rather than developing 
new solutions to tasks. Bowden (1985) concluded that time constraints prevented study 
subjects from using relevant information, and Isenberg (1981) linked time pressure to less 
equal information sharing among group members. Perlow and her colleagues (Perlow et 
al., 2002) observed that when a technology company accelerated firm-level decisions, 
those decisions were generally made using less information.  
In contrast, findings from Edland (1994) and Kerstholt’s (1994) laboratory 
experiments indicate that time constraints improve individual information processing, 
thereby enhancing work outcomes. Their results are supported by another laboratory 
study: Karau and Kelly (1992) observed that groups were more likely to filter out 
irrelevant cues under conditions of time pressure. In addition, based on her well-known 
field study of teams, Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that greater speed enhances 
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information processing. In particular, she found that teams who made faster decisions 
used real-time information more, compared to teams who made slower decisions.  
Second, whereas there is evidence that acceleration prevents people from 
developing a range of possible strategies (Blount et al., 2005; De Grada, Kruglanski, 
Mannetti, & Pierro, 1999; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Perlow et al., 2002)—thus 
leading to suboptimal choices—research also suggests that people facing time pressure 
may consider more rather than fewer alternatives (Eisenhardt, 1989). In line with the 
former perspective, Perlow and her colleagues (Perlow et al., 2002) found that a 
technology firm’s sense of urgency led to consideration of fewer alternative approaches 
and competing viewpoints. Similarly, Blount and her colleagues’ historical analysis of 
the Columbia shuttle launch revealed that an inflexible deadline created time pressure, 
which constrained NASA’s ability to contemplate alternatives as problems emerged. 
Their findings echo earlier theoretical work by Kruglanksi and Webster (1996)—who 
proposed that time urgency drives people to seek closure as soon as possible—and concur 
with more recent empirical research by Beeftink (2008), which suggests that acceleration 
makes it difficult for people to devote time to the “incubation” activities (Wallas, 1926) 
that are required to generate creative solutions. However, Eisenhardt’s (1989) research 
suggests an opposing view: she found that teams who made faster decisions actually 
considered a wider range of alternative strategies before making a final determination 
about how to proceed. 
Third, although scholars agree that an emphasis on acceleration drives shifts in 
strategy, they disagree as to whether such shifts result in superior versus inferior work 
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processes. Gersick (1988) concluded that time pressure catalyzed beneficial strategic 
shifts in teams: she found that, as deadlines approached, groups “dropped old patterns, 
reengaged with outside supervisors, (and) adopted new perspectives on their work” that 
enabled them to make “dramatic progress” (16). She (1988, 1989) thus suggested that 
deadlines drive greater strategic inventiveness and flexibility as teams strive to complete 
their work in the context of imposed time constraints. Scholars who study new product 
development (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Crawford, 1992; Lukas et al., 2002) agree with 
Gersick that the presence of deadlines modifies work strategies, but argue that such shifts 
degrade rather than improve work processes. For instance, Crawford (1992) theorized 
that deadlines encourage people to shift emphasis away from time-consuming ideation 
and market research toward implementation, which means that problems surface later—
rather than earlier—during the process of product development, when they are often more 
costly and complicated to address. Similarly, Lukas and his colleagues (Lukas et al., 
2002) found that deadlines may push teams to shorten or omit key phases in the new 
product development process as they rush toward a rapid launch. 
These mixed results from prior research suggest that acceleration is a complex 
phenomenon that may operate and unfold differently depending on the dynamics in a 
particular setting. As Chen and his colleagues point out: “Cooper and Kleinschmidt’s 
(1994) notion that (greater) ‘speed is king with some caveats’ suggests that (increasing) 
speed is not desirable under all conditions” (Chen et al., 2012: 289). In line with this 
perspective, a number of scholars have considered how different aspects of a specific 
context may shape acceleration outcomes. Ittner and Larcker (1997) found that two 
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practices—the use of cross-functional teams and incorporation of advanced design 
tools—influenced whether a more rapid product development cycle led to superior 
performance in the market. Kelly and Karau (1993) learned that the nature of 
interpersonal interactions affected whether time limits hindered or enhanced group 
creativity. Baer and Oldham (2006) concluded that the degree of supervisor support 
mattered when examining the effects of time pressure on creativity. Two sets of 
researchers found that greater speed in product development was only beneficial when 
the work was more predictable and less risky (Chen et al., 2012; Kessler & Bierly, 2002). 
Finally, several scholars have proposed that comparing one’s progress to that of others 
influences how people respond to time constraints (Ancona, Goodman, et al., 2001; 
Zerubavel, 1981). 
 Scholars have also suggested that it is important to take into account the amount 
of speed—the specific time constraints imposed in a particular situation—in order to 
understand the nuanced implications of acceleration (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Latham 
& Locke, 1975; Locke & Latham, 2002; Moore & Tenney, 2012). For instance, Moore 
and Tenney (2012: 313) proposed that there may be an “optimal deadline” (i.e., 
timeframe) for each type of task, and a number of researchers (e.g., Baer & Oldham, 
2006; Chen et al., 2012) have found a curvilinear relationship between speed and 
performance. 
 
The preceding discussion of the extant literature calls attention to the localized 
nature of acceleration. First, as noted earlier, previous field studies reveal not only that 
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organizations employ a broad range of tactics in service of acceleration (e.g., imposing 
deadlines, creating norms), but also that they conceptualize acceleration in varying ways 
(e.g., speeding up task completion, eliciting longer work hours). Second, prior research 
indicates that acceleration may enhance or diminish people’s experiences and work 
outcomes/processes, depending on various aspects of the specific setting (e.g., nature of 
group interactions, degree of predictability in the work environment). Taken together, 
these two points suggest that understanding how a particular organization pursues greater 
speed is key to comprehending how people experience and respond to acceleration in that 
setting. In other words, we may extend our knowledge of acceleration in organizations—
in terms of its multiple meanings, forms, and implications—by considering acceleration 
in situ.  
In this dissertation, I embrace this situated view of acceleration: I seek to 
understand what happens when a particular organization tries to speed up its members’ 
work. As I explain in the subsequent Methods chapter, my ethnographic study allowed 
me to build grounded theory based on a specific organization’s approach to acceleration, 
and its members’ experiences of and responses to that approach.  
 
DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
Following this introductory chapter, I provide (in Chapter 2) a detailed description 
of the ethnographic methodology and inductive mode of analysis that I used to address 
my two key research questions. Next, in Chapters 3 and 4, I present my findings: Chapter 
3 explains how the organization I studied pursued acceleration—by employing a complex 
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set of acceleration tactics—and Chapter 4 discusses how the organization’s localized 
approach to acceleration shaped its members’ experiences and work. Finally, in Chapter 5, 
I elaborate my broader contributions to theories of acceleration, and suggest future 
directions for research.  
	  	  
17 
CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
In order to answer the two key research questions outlined in the Introduction 
(Chapter 1), I conducted an inductive, ethnographic study of a seed accelerator, 
“InnoTech”1. In the sections below, I discuss my rationale for adopting an ethnographic 
approach and offer a detailed description of my research setting. I then describe how I 
collected and analyzed my data. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN: ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH 
I adopted an ethnographic approach (Becker, 1998; Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & 
Lofland, 2006; Spradley, 1979) because this methodology was well-suited to answering 
my research questions. First, ethnographic studies are appropriate when building theory: 
they allow the researcher to remain open to—and thus theorize—the dynamics unfolding 
in a real-world setting (Patton, 2002). Second, because ethnographic studies incorporate 
observation, informal conversations, and interviews, they yield insights not only about 
people’s behaviors but also their internal experiences (Patton, 2002). Third, 
ethnographies are ideal for exploring temporal concepts, such as acceleration, given that 
they “provide critical details of the daily practices through which time is built up as a 
meaningful ordering category” (Dubinskas, 1988a: 23). Finally, an ethnographic 
approach is characterized by flexibility, in terms of research process as well as focus 
(Becker, 1998; Patton, 2002). Therefore I was able to refine not only my approach (e.g., 
interview protocols, sampling selections) but also my research questions based on my 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 InnoTech is a pseudonym (to protect confidentiality).  
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ongoing, evolving engagement with the field site (Becker, 1998; Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991). 
An ethnographic method was also appropriate because I sought to comprehend 
acceleration in situ. As I discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1), how organizations 
interpret and implement acceleration varies. For instance, whereas I discovered (as I 
explain in Chapter 3) that InnoTech sought to speed up new venture funding, Perlow and 
her colleagues (Perlow et al., 2002) found that a technology company’s sense of urgency 
was operationalized in terms of its rate of decision making. Although laboratory studies 
offer valuable insights into acceleration that field studies cannot—they enable precise 
identification and measurement of variables that influence work outcomes—in order to 
understand organizations’ localized approaches, and how these approaches shape 
people’s experiences and work, in-depth studies of specific settings are required (Patton, 
2002). By providing a rich investigation in one particular organization (InnoTech), my 
dissertation adds nuance to conversations about the multifaceted meanings of, approaches 
to, and implications of acceleration across settings. 
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
I conducted my research at InnoTech, a seed accelerator. Accelerators aim to 
speed up the early stages of venture creation by providing extensive resources—such as 
seed capital2, workspace, mentorship, and educational programming—within the context 
of time-compressed (usually twelve-week) programs (Cohen, 2013a; Miller & Bound, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Seed capital refers to the relatively small amounts of money that investors give to pre-revenue 
companies (usually in return for equity). 
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2011). In return for these resources, accelerators take a small amount of equity in each 
company that participates in their programs. 
Accelerators are sometimes erroneously confused or conflated with more 
traditional business incubators (Grimaldi & Grandi, 2005; Konczal, 2012; van 
Huijgevoort, 2012), which have existed since the mid-twentieth century. Often created as 
public sector or university-based vehicles for fostering regional development, incubators 
vary in the degree to which they offer companies resources. However, most provide only 
a place to work (Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria, & Sull, 2000). Furthermore, incubators are 
not time-bounded: they do not specify for how long companies may use their facilities 
(Cohen, 2013a). 
Entrepreneurs are selected for accelerator programs through a competitive 
application process. Admitted entrepreneurs enter and finish accelerator programs 
together, as cohorts, at times scheduled by the accelerator. Program sessions typically end 
with a formal presentation to potential investors, wherein entrepreneurs are expected to 
try to obtain funding for their ventures (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014). After graduation, 
companies become part of an accelerator’s portfolio, and remain in that portfolio until 
they reach some form of “exit” (i.e., failure, sale, or IPO). 
Accelerators emerged in the mid-2000s as new organizational forms, and have 
since become key players in the entrepreneurship ecosystem. There are now over three 
hundred accelerators worldwide, across six continents (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014). 
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Theoretical Motivation for Setting 
InnoTech was an ideal research site for several reasons. First, acceleration—i.e., 
greater speed—was the primary goal of the organization: the driving mission expressed 
by the InnoTech Management Team was to speed up the process of new venture creation. 
Thus, in the context of studying acceleration, InnoTech represents an extreme case. 
Extreme cases are desirable when the goal is theory building, because dynamics are more 
visible than they would be in a less extreme setting (Patton, 2002). Second, InnoTech’s 
cohort format—which required that companies enter and graduate together—provided an 
opportunity to compare and contrast the entrepreneurs’ experiences and journeys as they 
moved through the accelerator program. Third, the bounded nature (i.e., twelve-week 
duration) of the InnoTech program enabled me to collect comprehensive data spanning 
the entire course of two accelerator sessions: I could follow the entrepreneurs as they 
entered, moved through, and left the program. Thus I was able to connect the 
entrepreneurs’ emotions and behavior to the passage of time, as well as to specific 
elements of the InnoTech program. 
 
Field Site: InnoTech 
InnoTech runs a twelve-week accelerator program twice a year. For each program 
session, InnoTech admits thirteen to sixteen ventures, most of which consist of two 
entrepreneurs, or company “founders”. Each admitted venture receives about twenty 
thousand dollars in seed capital, and InnoTech takes six percent of each company’s 
equity. Each InnoTech program session is marked by a number of mandatory events: 
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orientation, “mentor speed dating”, lead partner meetings, dinner/breakfast sessions, 
Open House, and Investor Day. These events are depicted chronologically in Figure 2.1 
and described briefly in Table 2.1.  
InnoTech is run by a small Management Team. This Team includes three Lead 
Partners, a Director, and two Administrative Assistants.3 Each venture is paired with one 
Lead Partner; that Lead Partner serves as a venture’s de facto primary advisor at 
InnoTech. The Director is in charge of day-to-day operations for the accelerator, and also 
mentors entrepreneurs on an ad hoc basis. The Administrative Assistants are assigned 
various operational tasks, such as scheduling and event management. 
According to the Management Team, InnoTech admits ventures (from a large 
applicant pool) using three main criteria. First, InnoTech chooses companies whose 
founders are perceived as both “mentorable” (i.e., capable of receiving and listening to 
advice) and likely to get along with other people (e.g., the Management Team members, 
other entrepreneurs). Second, InnoTech prefers companies whose founders have proven 
that they can get work done; they look for evidence that the founders can execute as a 
team. Third, InnoTech generally selects companies whose products or services are a good 
match with the Management Team’s expertise. 
The InnoTech office spans one floor of a large building. At the center of the space 
is a large, open common area with a “work bar” (a long communal work table), smaller 
work surfaces, a ping pong table, comfortable couches and chairs, a video game system, 
and free beer on tap. This common area serves several purposes: not only do events, such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Although some members were male, throughout the dissertation I refer to all members of the 
Management Team as female, to help ensure confidentiality and anonymity. 
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as speaker sessions and the Open House, take place there, but the entrepreneurs also often 
work, hold meetings, or take breaks in the common area. Common area activities, 
including conversations, are quite public and can be heard throughout the InnoTech space, 
especially in the nearby offices.  
Adjacent to the common area is a kitchen with a large refrigerator housing 
InnoTech-provided food as well as individually-owned food. Two hallways radiate off of 
the common area. Along these hallways are individual offices (with clear glass doors) for 
each venture. In the hallways are hammocks and beanbag chairs, where the entrepreneurs 
sometimes nap or work.  
 
Gaining Access to InnoTech 
I gained access to the InnoTech organization by contacting the Director. After 
several conversations, she agreed to let me conduct research at InnoTech, as long as my 
presence did not distract the entrepreneurs from their work. In particular, the Director 
was concerned that observing the entrepreneurs while they worked on their companies 
would detract from their ability to focus. I thus promised that I would try to avoid 
interrupting the entrepreneurs while I shadowed them, as much as possible. This 
agreement had implications for my ability to ask questions about what I was observing, 
as it was happening, but it was crucial to securing entry to InnoTech. (As my 
relationships with the entrepreneurs deepened, over the course of the program sessions, 
they often volunteered additional information as they worked, thus rendering my 
agreement with the Director less inhibitive.) 
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Gaining access to InnoTech through the Director did not automatically give me 
full permission to study the entrepreneurs participating in its program. InnoTech did not 
have direct authority over the entrepreneurs participating in its programs; each company 
was a legally separate, incorporated entity. Therefore, although securing access from the 
Director meant that I had permission to observe activities (e.g., workshops, presentations) 
in the common area, I had to obtain consent from each of the entrepreneurs in order to 
interact with, interview, or shadow them as they worked. To get this expanded access, I 
approached the individual founders working on a particular venture. If an entire team of 
entrepreneurs agreed that I could study their company, I secured written permission from 
each founder.  
Some companies were willing to allow me broad access, whereas others were 
more restricted in their permission. The result of this variation was that my access to the 
entrepreneurs was stratified according to three different levels, which I call “base-level,” 
“mid-level,” and “full-level”. Base-level access—which applied to all the entrepreneurs, 
according to my agreement with the InnoTech Director—meant that I was allowed to 
observe the entrepreneurs working and interacting in the common area. Mid- and full-
level access meant that I had additional permission, provided by the entrepreneurs 
themselves: mid-level access allowed me to speak informally with the entrepreneurs and 
to interview them at scheduled times, and full-level access allowed me to shadow the 
entrepreneurs, in their offices or elsewhere.  
InnoTech would not reveal, publicly or to me, which companies it had admitted 
until after a program session had started. I therefore could not initiate the process of 
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gaining access to the entrepreneurs until after each session was underway. I began this 
process towards the start of each of the two sessions I studied. At this time, InnoTech 
introduced me to the entrepreneurs during a group gathering, and informed them that I 
had permission to be in the accelerator space. I explained that I was broadly interested in 
how entrepreneurs think about time, and that I would be present at InnoTech throughout 
the program. Beyond this brief introduction that outlined my base-level access to all the 
entrepreneurs, InnoTech left me to my own devices to recruit and secure access to the 
individual entrepreneurs and companies.  
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 I conducted my research at InnoTech in two phases, spanning two separate 
program sessions. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the data collected during each phase. 
The first phase, which spanned the first program session I studied, was geared toward 
discovery (Swedberg, 2012), with the goal of learning firsthand about the accelerator 
setting and refining my research questions through initial theorizing (Becker, 1998). I 
entered the field with a broad research interest: I wanted to explore what happened when 
an organization sought to accelerate new ventures. I spent one to two days a week at 
InnoTech during this phase, observing, interviewing, and interacting with the 
entrepreneurs currently participating in the program, as well as with several of its alumni. 
I also read InnoTech documents—such as website materials, press releases, and tweets—
to become more familiar with the language and perspectives of the Management Team. 
Finally, I immersed myself in the broader landscape of accelerators by reading materials 
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from the Global Accelerator Network (an organization that supports and seeks to 
standardize accelerator programs around the world), perusing other accelerator programs’ 
marketing materials, watching a documentary series about a different accelerator, and 
attending local entrepreneur networking events. The initial phase of my research made 
me more fluent in the terminology used by entrepreneurs and accelerators, and helped me 
understand the key components and culture of the InnoTech program. It also helped me 
refine my research questions to focus on InnoTech’s localized approach to acceleration, 
and how this approach shaped the entrepreneurs’ experiences and work. 
For the second phase of the study, I returned to the field for another session of the 
InnoTech program. Data collection during this phase was targeted toward understanding 
the implications of InnoTech’s attempts to accelerate venture creation for the 
entrepreneurs. During this phase, I spent three to four days a week at InnoTech. As in the 
first phase, I engaged in observation, interviews, and informal interactions with the 
entrepreneurs. However, relative to the first phase, I weighted my time more toward 
shadowing and interviewing the entrepreneurs than toward general forms of observation. 
I also interviewed each member of the InnoTech Management Team. 
 
Sampling 
My participants (summarized in Table 2.3) included fifty-five entrepreneurs 
(across twenty-eight different companies), four alumni (spanning four companies) of the 
program (i.e., entrepreneurs who had graduated from InnoTech previously), and the six 
members of the InnoTech Management Team. I recruited the entrepreneurs according to 
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an emergent sampling strategy (Patton, 2002): desiring participants who could provide 
me with rich data and serve as key informants, I approached those individuals who 
seemed the most open to talking to me, and most comfortable having me observe them in 
their offices.  
The entrepreneur participants (listed in Table 2.4) were stratified according to the 
three different levels of access: base-, mid-, and full-level. The distribution of participants 
across these levels of access (summarized in Table 2.5) differed significantly between the 
two phases of my study. In the first phase, because the goal was broad learning about the 
accelerator context, base-level access—which permitted me to observe the InnoTech 
Management Team and entrepreneurs in the common area—was generally sufficient. 
However, during this phase I realized I needed a handful of key informants who could 
answer my questions and provide me with additional insights. I therefore sought and 
secured expanded access to five entrepreneurs (one mid-level and four full-level).  
In the second phase of my study, equipped with prior understanding of the 
InnoTech context, and seeking to address my more focused research questions, I needed 
opportunities to learn more about the entrepreneurs’ work and experiences. I could not 
rely on base-level access to get these data, so I sought further access to all of the 
entrepreneurs. Based on their varying levels of willingness to grant me permission, I 
obtained mid-level access to twenty entrepreneurs, and full-level access to eight 
entrepreneurs. (One team, Media4U, was resistant to anything beyond base-level access. 
However, the CEO of that company did complete a written end-of-program reflection.)  
I did not seek full access to all of the companies during the second phase of my 
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research because I wanted to shadow several companies repeatedly, in depth, rather than 
shadowing more companies less often. The intent of this approach was two-fold. First, I 
wanted to build relationships with a core set of entrepreneurs who could serve as key 
informants. Second, in order to understand the entrepreneurs’ experiences and activities 
over the course of the entire twelve-week program, I needed continuous, weekly data. I 
therefore gained full-level access to a set of eight entrepreneurs working on four separate 
companies. I chose these companies according to purposeful sampling (Patton, 2002). I 
wanted to keep a key factor constant across the core set of entrepreneurs: assigned Lead 
Partner. I also wanted variation based on another potentially significant factor: gender. Of 
the four teams I secured for the core sample, two had female CEOs and two had male 
CEOs. (There were only two female CEOs in the entire cohort.)4 
 In addition to the entrepreneurs currently participating in the accelerator, my 
sample included four alumni of the InnoTech program. I recruited these alumni primarily 
through convenience sampling (Patton, 2002): either they approached me while I was 
observing the current cohort of entrepreneurs and wanted to talk to me about their 
experiences, or I knew them through mutual contacts. Although there were often alumni 
present at InnoTech—due to the presence of a coworking space upstairs in the same 
building—during both phases of my research, I only collected data explicitly from them 
during the first phase of my study. The purpose of these interactions was to help me learn, 
as quickly as possible, about the InnoTech program. Given that the alumni were not 
currently going through the accelerator program, I did not observe them in their work, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Although my sample contained female entrepreneurs, for the purpose of preserving anonymity, I 
refer to all the entrepreneurs using masculine terminology. 
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rather had informal conversations with them (two alumni) or interviewed them more 
formally (two alumni).  
 The final segment of my study sample was the InnoTech Management Team. 
According to the permission granted by the Director, I was allowed to observe 
Management Team members in the common area, and to interview each of the six 
members individually. 
 
Data Sources 
In line with my ethnographic approach, I used observation, semi-structured 
interviews, and a reflection tool to gather data. I also collected archival documents 
pertaining to InnoTech, the companies participating in InnoTech’s program, and 
accelerators more broadly. In total, the data for my dissertation included over four 
hundred hours of observation, fifty-seven semi-structured interviews (with entrepreneurs, 
alumni, and the InnoTech Management Team), six end-of-program reflections (four 
written responses, two recorded conversations), and more than seventy archival 
documents (e.g., blog posts, emails, tweets, documentary episodes, articles about 
accelerators). Table 2.2 presents a summary of these data, in totality as well as broken 
down by study phase. 
Observation. I completed a total of four hundred and nine hours of non-
participant observation (spanning fifty-six days) across the two phases of my study. 
Observing the entrepreneurs helped me gain a rich understanding of what they were 
working on, talking about, and feeling on a moment-to-moment and day-to-day basis 
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throughout the accelerator program. Observing them interacting with the members of the 
InnoTech Management Team also gave me a sense of the InnoTech program, as context 
for the entrepreneurs’ experiences and actions, over the course of the twelve weeks.  
The nature of my observations of each entrepreneur depended on the level of 
access I had to that entrepreneur. For base- and mid-level access participants, my 
observations took place only in the common area. Thus I observed them working or 
taking breaks in the common area and participating in mandatory InnoTech activities 
(e.g., biweekly sessions). My observations of full-level access participants included 
additional settings and activities: I was able to watch them working on their ventures in 
their offices and listen in on phone conversations. During the first phase of my study, I 
observed each of the two full-level access companies once, for approximately half a day. 
During the second phase of my study, I spent at least a half a day every week with each 
of the four full-access level companies. (I originally expected to spend a full day a week 
with each company, but I soon discovered that the frequency of mandatory InnoTech 
activities made that difficult.) In some cases, I arranged in advance when I would be 
shadowing a particular company. However, given the often-changing schedules of the 
entrepreneurs, I often had to act opportunistically on a given day, and ask to observe 
whichever company was present at InnoTech. 
I took detailed fieldnotes—according to ethnographic techniques (Emerson, Fretz, 
& Shaw, 1995)—while I was observing the entrepreneurs. Anticipating that it would be 
hard to predict exactly what might be relevant to my research questions, I recorded fairly 
broad, inclusive fieldnotes, rather than limiting my focus. Although some settings make it 
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difficult or awkward for researchers to take notes, the work environment at InnoTech 
made note taking fairly unobtrusive. Almost everyone at InnoTech worked on a laptop 
most of the day, so I was able to carry around my own laptop and type notes, in real time, 
in practically every situation. In many instances, I was able to record verbatim quotes 
from the founders and the InnoTech Management Team. I thus had to do very little 
retrospective recall to fill in gaps in my notes. However, I did review my fieldnotes most 
evenings, in order to revise certain points and to write memos about what I had observed 
that day. 
I was not merely a fly-on-the-wall observer. My frequent presence and openness 
to talking paved the way for countless informal conversations with the entrepreneurs. On 
many occasions, once I had developed a relationship with an entrepreneur, I was able to 
ask in-the-moment questions to get a better understanding of something I had observed. 
Some of the entrepreneurs also used me as a resource to help them with their work. For 
instance, they asked me for feedback on website mockups, the wording and design of 
presentations, and even their grammar.  
Semi-structured interviews. Across the two phases of my study, I conducted a 
total of fifty-seven semi-structured interviews with the entrepreneurs, alumni, and 
InnoTech Management Team members in my sample. The interviews took place at 
InnoTech (in conference rooms or company offices). All were recorded and transcribed. 
The interview protocols for each set of participants are included in Appendix A.  
For the entrepreneurs, the purpose of the interviews—which were scheduled for 
thirty minutes but often lasted longer—was to understand their experiences during the 
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InnoTech program, and gain insight into the actions I was observing. I kept the questions 
fairly open-ended, thus allowing the entrepreneurs to lead me where their own emotions 
and thoughts took them. During the first phase of the study, I interviewed three 
entrepreneurs. I conducted these interviews towards the end of the program, once I felt 
comfortable in my knowledge of InnoTech and had built relationships that helped me 
persuade the entrepreneurs to talk to me. During the second phase of the study, I 
interviewed twenty-seven founders during the seventh week of the program. I was able to 
re-interview nineteen of those entrepreneurs after the program had ended, and the 
companies had dispersed. (The other eight entrepreneurs never responded to my multiple 
attempts to reestablish contact after the end of the InnoTech program.)  
The alumni interviews—which were also scheduled for thirty minutes—helped 
me develop the interview protocols for the entrepreneurs and allowed me to ask questions 
about InnoTech that I did not want to pose to the Management Team or to the 
entrepreneurs currently participating in the accelerator program. I conducted three alumni 
interviews during the first phase of my study. I did not conduct further interviews with 
alumni during the second phase of my study, although I did use several of them as 
sounding boards as I was developing my interview questions for the founders. 
The goal of the interviews with the six members of the InnoTech Management 
Team—which lasted forty to sixty minutes and occurred toward the end of the second 
study phase—was to understand what InnoTech meant by acceleration, the intent behind 
the design of the InnoTech program, and how the accelerator defined and measured 
success. 
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End-of-program reflections. For the second phase of my study, I created a short 
reflection tool (see Appendix B). I distributed this tool—which was designed to capture 
the entrepreneurs’ feelings and thoughts as the program drew to a close—to all of the 
entrepreneurs in the session cohort, but very few responded. After a few attempts to gain 
greater participation, I realized that the timing of my data collection request coincided 
with one of the busiest weeks in the program, and the entrepreneurs had little attention or 
time to spare. In the end, six entrepreneurs (from five different companies) completed the 
reflection tool. Although it was intended as a written exercise, two of the six 
entrepreneurs requested a face-to-face conversation instead, stating they thought it would 
be easier and more efficient. Those two conversations were recorded and later transcribed. 
Archival documents. To complement my other data sources, I collected and read 
over seventy archival documents. These documents fell into two categories: those that 
provided information to help me get rich data, and those that provided additional data to 
help me with my analysis and theory building. The former category consisted of 
documents (e.g., newspaper articles, blog posts, documentary episodes, tweets) about, or 
authored by, accelerators, InnoTech, and the companies participating in the accelerator. 
These documents helped me learn about my research context so that I could speak in a 
more informed way, using the language of accelerators and entrepreneurship. They also 
helped keep me up to date in terms of news coverage about the companies: I used the 
news items to stay abreast of what each company was doing. The latter category 
consisted of documents—such as weekly emails from the Director or photos of office 
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whiteboards—that offered insights into what InnoTech was communicating to the 
entrepreneurs, and what the entrepreneurs were doing at a particular point in time. 
 
Integrating Personal Experience 
 I also drew on my own experiences at InnoTech as data (Spradley, 1979). Like the 
entrepreneurs I was studying, I was working within the context of the time-bound 
InnoTech program: for each session I studied, I had only twelve weeks to build 
relationships with informants and learn about their journeys through the accelerator. My 
data collection process was thus fairly unusual for an ethnographic study. Ethnographers 
typically alternate between time spent in and time spent out of the field. This allows them 
to review their fieldnotes, develop kernels of theory, and revise their protocols based on 
their initial analyses. In contrast, I could not afford to be out of the field for more than a 
day or so each week, because each day represented a significant percentage of the total 
time the entrepreneurs were at InnoTech. As a result, my data collection period was 
characterized by intensive, fairly continuous immersion in the field. Although this 
approach did not allow many opportunities for iterative analysis or reflection, it provided 
me with valuable insights into the challenges that the entrepreneurs faced as they tried to 
compress the early stages of venture creation into twelve weeks.  
 With the goal of using my own experiences as a window into the entrepreneurs’ 
worlds—but keeping in mind that my experiences might be similar to and/or different 
from those of the entrepreneurs I was studying (Emerson et al., 1995)—I recorded my 
thoughts, reactions, and feelings throughout both sessions of the InnoTech program that I 
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studied (Emerson et al., 1995; Spradley, 1979). I also held regular phone conversations 
with one of my committee members, who helped me reflect on and process my 
experiences in the moment. During these discussions, I captured key insights in writing. 
Later, as I was analyzing my data, I returned to my personal notes to deepen my 
emerging understanding of how the entrepreneurs experienced and responded to the 
InnoTech program (Patton, 2002; Spradley, 1979).  
 
DATA ANALYSIS  
 I analyzed my data—primarily the fieldnotes and interview transcripts—through 
an inductive, grounded theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001; Patton, 
2002). I used qualitative research software (NVivo) to help me organize and analyze the 
data. As I explain below, I engaged in an iterative process that carried me from coding 
the data, to writing memos, to considering existing theory, and back again to coding the 
data.  
 
Coding and Memoing 
I began with open coding, primarily of my fieldnotes and interview transcripts 
(Emerson et al., 1995). Although I approached the data with my research questions in 
mind, I remained broad in my focus: I sought to identify any data that offered insights 
into how InnoTech attempted to speed up venture creation, and how the entrepreneurs 
perceived, experienced, and responded to those attempts. I tagged any data snippets that 
provided such insights with relatively long, descriptive codes. These codes included a 
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summary of what was contained in the snippet, as well my own brief comments about 
what the snippet added to my evolving understanding of my research site. 
As I engaged in open coding, I wrote rough memos, trying to capture early 
hunches that might prove important later on (Emerson et al., 1995; Locke, Golden-Biddle, 
& Feldman, 2008). In particular, I captured themes as they emerged, identifying patterns 
across my open codes that seemed to point toward larger categories. Some of the themes 
that I noticed, and memoed about, at this stage of the data analysis included “intersection 
of company and accelerator rhythms,” “formal structures drive entrepreneurs’ work 
activities,” “tension between InnoTech work and ‘actual work’,” and “pressure”. As the 
following chapters make clear, many of these themes later became part of my more 
developed theorizing. 
Armed with the themes that surfaced from open coding, I moved to focused 
coding (Emerson et al., 1995), seeking to refine and elaborate those themes (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Locke, 2001). This stage was iterative, with multiple rounds of merging, 
separating, and revising codes from prior rounds. As my themes became more precise, I 
began working—aided by the writing of further memos (Emerson et al., 1995)—to 
interrelate them, seeking to understand how they might be linked. For instance, I realized 
that the “intersection of company and accelerator rhythms” was closely connected to the 
“tension between InnoTech work and ‘actual work’” that many of the entrepreneurs 
described. Similarly, I recognized that the themes of “pressure” and “formal structures 
drive entrepreneurs’ work activities” were related, in that applying pressure and imposing 
formal structures (such as biweekly sessions and the final Investor Day event) were both 
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specific tactics used by InnoTech to increase the entrepreneurs’ pace of work. 
 
Considering Existing Theory 
As I developed interrelated themes, and connected categories, I turned to the 
extant literature. In particular, I consulted prior research on acceleration, although I also 
reviewed scholarship on teams, entrepreneurship, and creative work. Reading these 
bodies of work simultaneously sharpened my emergent theorizing—by providing new 
lenses through which I could view the dynamics at InnoTech—and helped me identify 
what my study revealed that was not already present in the literature. Perhaps most 
notably, I discovered that Gersick’s (1994) discussion of temporal and event-based 
pacing provided a key anchor for my own analysis: her work not only offered a new way 
of understanding the tension felt by the entrepreneurs as they tried to respond to 
InnoTech’s efforts to accelerate their ventures, but also highlighted important aspects of 
pacing that remained under-theorized.  
Building and drawing on prior research, I engaged in further rounds of focused 
coding and theme refinement. Moving back and forth between the existing literature and 
my analysis, I slowly developed the theories that I present in the next two chapters. In the 
first of those two chapters (Chapter 3), I explain how InnoTech conceptualized and 
mandated acceleration. This chapter follows directly from the themes of “pressure” and 
“formal structures drive entrepreneurs’ work activities” that I mentioned above. In the 
second findings chapter (Chapter 4), I discuss the ways in which InnoTech’s localized 
approach to acceleration shaped how the entrepreneurs experienced and engaged in their 
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work. This chapter is rooted in the themes of “intersection of company and accelerator 
rhythms” and “tension between InnoTech work and ‘actual work’” that emerged from my 
early coding. 
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CHAPTER 3: ACCELERATION AT INNOTECH 
This chapter addresses my first key research question—how do organizations 
pursue acceleration?—by exploring the full range of tactics that InnoTech employed in 
their efforts to speed up the process of venture creation. As the following sections make 
clear, I found that although InnoTech certainly imposed deadlines to effect greater speed, 
deadlines represented just one component of a complex, comprehensive set of 
acceleration tactics. These tactics—which included establishing a meaningful deadline, 
amplifying the time pressure, and providing concentrated resources—were all inherently 
temporal. 
In this chapter, before elaborating these tactics further, I unpack what acceleration 
meant at InnoTech. First, I explain that InnoTech conceptualized acceleration in terms of 
speeding up investor funding. Second, I show how this conceptualization was tied to 
InnoTech’s emphasis on two specific types of work: making progress on the business and 
developing stories for investors. This discussion builds a foundation for understanding 
the organization’s acceleration tactics, which I describe in detail in the latter half of the 
chapter. 
Given that this chapter presents an analysis of the setting (i.e., InnoTech) in which 
the entrepreneurs were embedded, the data are derived primarily from my observation of 
the InnoTech Management Team’s communications and behaviors, as well as from my 
conversations and interviews with members of that Management Team. However, the 
analysis is also informed by my interactions and conversations with the individual 
entrepreneurs. 
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ACCELERATION AT INNOTECH: SPEEDING UP FUNDING 
InnoTech not only emphasized acceleration, it also mandated it. As I explained in 
the Introduction (Chapter 1), accelerate means to speed up, or “to cause (something) to 
happen sooner or more quickly” (“Accelerate,” 2012). Therefore, to comprehend what 
acceleration means in a particular context, it is important to understand not only what 
“sooner” or “more quickly” means—i.e., the timeframe—but also the “something” that 
ideally will be achieved in that timeframe.  
 
The Meaning of Acceleration at InnoTech: Getting Funding Sooner 
It was relatively straightforward to ascertain what “sooner” meant at InnoTech: 
the start and end dates of the accelerator program provided boundaries that delineated a 
clear timeframe of twelve weeks. InnoTech emphasized that it helped entrepreneurs 
accomplish more during the course of its twelve-week program than they would if they 
were operating outside of InnoTech. For instance, the accelerator’s website promised 
prospective applicants that participating in one of its programs meant a “chance to put a 
concentrated effort into going faster”. Similarly, the Director described InnoTech as 
being “in the business of trying to help people…go further and faster.” She also often told 
the media, as well as prospective applicants, that InnoTech enabled entrepreneurs “to do 
in twelve weeks what might otherwise take a year”.  
Although the timeframe for acceleration was fairly evident (i.e., twelve weeks), 
identifying what the “something” that InnoTech wanted entrepreneurs to accomplish 
quickly, by the end of those twelve weeks, was more complex. When I first entered the 
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field, I expected that InnoTech would focus on helping the entrepreneurs refine their 
business ideas, and work towards implementing those ideas. Given that the companies 
participating in the accelerator’s program were fairly early in terms of the venture 
creation process, I assumed that InnoTech would need to support the entrepreneurs’ 
relatively fledging efforts to figure out what their business models were, and how they 
should go about getting their products or services out into the market. I was thus 
surprised when I observed that InnoTech pushed the entrepreneurs to focus on preparing 
to raise money from investors. As I discuss below, getting the entrepreneurs to prepare 
for fundraising did mean exhorting the entrepreneurs to make progress on their 
businesses, but it also meant requiring that they engage in tasks unrelated to building 
their businesses, such as developing and perfecting presentations for investors. 
As I endeavored to understand why InnoTech emphasized fundraising, I realized 
that the accelerator focused on starting the fundraising process earlier because it believed 
that obtaining external resources would increase the chances that the entrepreneurs’ 
ventures would survive, beyond the end of the InnoTech program (and, ideally until the 
founders had reached a successful exit, such as a sale or an IPO). As the Director 
commented:  
You need to come out (at the end of the program) and get extra money, or 
you’re going to die. We all know that… When teams are well-positioned 
(at the end of twelve weeks) to raise money, that’s a good indicator of at 
least short-term success. 
 
A Lead Partner communicated a similar message about the criticality of securing funding 
quickly during the program orientation:  
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If you don’t complete fundraising in the magic three months after 
InnoTech (ends), it is really hard…. So we’re going to be answering 
questions about fundraising… (starting) from day one (of the program).  
 
Striving to Get Funding Faster: Making Progress and Developing Stories 
I found that InnoTech saw two types of work as crucial to prepare for fundraising 
at the end of the twelve weeks: making progress on the business and developing stories 
for investors. One Lead Partner explained that both of these types of work were important 
precursors to seeking funding: “(If) you’re going to raise money, you need to get your 
story (for investors) together and you need to show progress… It’s both truly working on 
the business and…working on the story.” The Director echoed this idea when she 
described what the entrepreneurs should have accomplished at the end of twelve weeks:  
They’re going to have a good story. They’re going to have made adequate 
progress on their product and sales and customer development and business 
development. They’re going to have the wind at their back, in terms of raising 
follow-on funding. 
 
In the following sections, I discuss each type of work—making progress on the 
business and developing stories for investors—in detail, and explain why InnoTech 
believed each was relevant to speeding up funding. In addition, I reveal that InnoTech not 
only specified explicitly what kinds of tasks comprised each category of work, but also 
often stipulated how those tasks should be done. 
Making progress on the business. In order to convince investors to provide them 
with capital, InnoTech believed the entrepreneurs needed to make significant progress on 
their businesses. Making progress prior to approaching investors was seen as critical for 
two reasons. First, progress was a way of demonstrating to potential investors that the 
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entrepreneurs’ businesses offered viable products or services that could attract customers. 
Second, making progress signaled to investors that the team of entrepreneurs building a 
business was capable of executing concrete tasks. Pointing to work already completed, or 
important milestones already achieved (e.g., launching a product, signing up customers), 
allowed the entrepreneurs to tell investors that they had a track record of effective 
implementation. One of the Lead Partners underscored the link between making progress 
and persuading investors during the InnoTech orientation, exhorting the assembled 
entrepreneurs to use the next twelve weeks to make substantial progress so that they 
could approach investors more effectively:  
InnoTech will help you move to a place where progress is demonstrated and 
obvious… When you (talk to investors), you want them to say ‘Wow! This team 
made incredible progress and I want to give them resources’. 
  
InnoTech viewed one specific form of progress as most likely to impress 
investors: gaining “traction” in the market. Traction meant market validation, or being 
able to demonstrate actual demand for a venture’s product or service. As one Lead 
Partner told the entrepreneurs, investors needed evidence that a business model worked: 
“(You) need to show traction or else investors won’t commit.” Another Lead Partner 
remarked that investors wanted to see that ventures had moved “somewhere up the curve 
of market proof”. 
 InnoTech pushed the entrepreneurs to concentrate on customer acquisition, 
because signing up users represented visible traction: having users demonstrated that 
there was a market for the entrepreneurs’ products or services. InnoTech explained its 
emphasis on customer acquisition by pointing to its experience with companies that had 
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graduated from its program in the past and failed. One of the Lead Partners said: 
“Looking back at the previous companies (who went through InnoTech but failed)… the 
major issue was a lack of customer traction. So the focus…(is now on) getting traction 
with customers.” Another Lead Partner told the entrepreneurs:  
(My) biggest question for you is how you are going to get your first customers and 
make that real. The next time you see investors they’re not going to care you 
made progress on your product and that your user interface design looks better. 
They are going to care about customers. 
 
In keeping with its emphasis on traction, InnoTech directed the entrepreneurs’ 
efforts away from forms of progress that it thought would be less likely to catch investors’ 
attention. For instance, the accelerator advised one team of entrepreneurs not to spend 
time refining their company’s marketing materials during the program, because investors 
would not care whether or not they had improved their marketing message. Instead, 
InnoTech suggested the entrepreneurs focus on signing up more customers, and getting 
press coverage to support those efforts, since having more customers would help them 
win over investors at the end of twelve weeks.   
Developing stories for investors. In addition to making progress on their 
businesses, InnoTech felt the entrepreneurs needed to have compelling stories about those 
businesses that they could use to persuade investors. As one Lead Partner explained, 
stories were important because they allowed the entrepreneurs to overcome some of the 
liabilities they faced because their businesses were so nascent: “Startups have a lot going 
against them, but they have stories they can tell, and this is their biggest asset”. She later 
reinforced this point when talking to the entrepreneurs:  
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Your biggest competitive edge (when talking to investors) is your story. There is 
probably someone out there bigger than you. But they don’t have your story. For 
example, ‘I was inspired by my nephew to create an education company.’ 
 
The primary way that InnoTech expected the entrepreneurs to communicate their 
stories was through short investor “pitches”. InnoTech saw these brief presentations as 
central to entrepreneurs’ ability to persuade investors for three reasons. First, as I learned 
by attending networking events and reading about venture investment, pitches were the 
generally accepted communication approach that people in the entrepreneurship 
community used in fundraising. Second, pitches were seen as a way of leveraging stories 
to excite investors about the entrepreneurs’ ideas, thereby paving the way for further 
conversations about funding. As one Lead Partner commented: “The point (of a pitch) is 
to get an investor to want to talk to you”.  
InnoTech urged the entrepreneurs to use the tools of theater—such as narrative 
and stagecraft—to generate enthusiasm among investors. For instance, after hearing one 
of the entrepreneurs practice his pitch, a Lead Partner told him that he needed to increase 
his level of energy and emotion, and “embody the excitement” about his business. After 
another practice pitch, a different Lead Partner told the same entrepreneur:  
Something is not quite capturing the delight you’re capable of, that we saw you 
do in earlier pitches. You need to smile more because you’re describing surprise 
and delight (that people feel about your product). 
 
Third, InnoTech saw pitches as the ideal way to showcase the progress that 
entrepreneurs had already accomplished. By choosing carefully which accomplishments 
to talk about, and how to talk about them, entrepreneurs would have a better chance of 
convincing investors to provide funds. InnoTech frequently reminded the entrepreneurs 
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to emphasize their progress in their pitches. For instance, a Lead Partner told one 
entrepreneur to rewrite his pitch because it failed to convey the actual progress he and his 
company had made: “Make your pitch more concrete. You already have traction so (the 
pitch) shouldn’t be so abstract at the start.” InnoTech advised another entrepreneur in 
similar terms:  
You need to lead with the fact that you already have customers. You need to 
emphasize that you have traction… You’re one of those companies that actually 
already has traction and you need to talk about it (in your pitch). 
 
InnoTech guided the entrepreneurs through two phases of story development. 
During the first six weeks of the program, the entrepreneurs worked on a thirty-second, 
verbal-only “elevator pitch”. During the second six weeks, the entrepreneurs worked to 
expand the brief elevator pitch into a four-minute presentation with slides. These pitches 
followed similar formats: the entrepreneurs generally identified a problem in the 
marketplace/world, explained how their business solved this problem, highlighted the 
progress that they had made towards their solution, and called on the audience 
members—specifically the investors—to join them in their pursuit of the identified 
opportunity.  
Pitch standardization across the cohort of entrepreneurs resulted in large part from 
InnoTech’s input. InnoTech often told the entrepreneurs exactly how to pitch, according 
to their ideal of entrepreneur storytelling. For instance, InnoTech told the entrepreneurs 
how long their pitches should be, and timed the pitches to make sure the companies all 
had pitches of approximately that length. InnoTech also frequently told the entrepreneurs 
what to say and how to say it. For instance, during one pitch feedback session, the 
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InnoTech Director told the assembled entrepreneurs that they should always start their 
pitches by introducing themselves as the CEO of their companies: “It’s standard in a 
pitch to say ‘I am CEO of X.’” During a different pitch feedback session, the Director 
instructed the entrepreneurs to end their pitches by asking the audience members to find 
them online or on their smartphones, and to try out their products/services: “If you have 
something live, you can ask (the audience) to use it.” 
 Although the sections above suggest that making progress on the business and 
developing compelling stories for investors were separate streams of work, these two 
types of work were in fact intertwined. If entrepreneurs made progress on their businesses, 
they could describe that progress in their pitches, thus making it easier for them to 
persuade investors to fund them. Similarly, as InnoTech often reminded the entrepreneurs, 
the process of developing pitches pushed them to articulate what their businesses did, and 
how they planned to make money. They thus became clearer about the core elements of 
their products or services, as well as how to create those products or services. As one 
Lead Partner said: “The point is being able to explain your business model (in your 
pitch)… Doing this never fails to make the company better.” 
 
FOSTERING ACCELERATION AT INNOTECH 
 To speed up business progress and story development—and thereby prepare the 
entrepreneurs to begin fundraising at the end of the twelve-week program—InnoTech 
employed three different types of acceleration tactics. First, InnoTech established a 
meaningful deadline. Second, InnoTech amplified the time pressure. Third, InnoTech 
	  	  
47 
provided concentrated resources. Table 3.1 summarizes these three types of acceleration 
tactics and explains how each was used in service of speeding up funding. 
These three categories of tactics, which emerged from my inductive analysis, 
were not only geared toward increasing the entrepreneurs’ pace of work—and thus 
decreasing the time it took for them to get funding—but were temporal in and of 
themselves. More specifically, each type of tactic was rooted in and drew on InnoTech’s 
assumptions about the value and meaning of greater speed. 
 
Establishing a Meaningful Deadline 
 The first tactic InnoTech used to foster acceleration was establishing a meaningful 
deadline. This tactic consisted of bounding the timeframe—by designing a program that 
began and ended at particular times—and imbuing the timeframe with significance—by 
scheduling an event (Investor Day) to coincide with the end of the program. 
Bounding the timeframe. Each session of the InnoTech program took place over 
a pre-specified span of twelve weeks. The admitted entrepreneurs graduated, as a cohort, 
from the program twelve weeks after entering it. The twelve-week timeframe was a way 
of setting a rapid pace and generating a feeling of urgency in order to motivate the 
entrepreneurs to work quickly. One Lead Partner elaborated on this idea:  
The general pace of the whole twelve weeks creates a feeling that you need to be 
moving faster and that you want to move faster. That you are going to do 
everything you can inside that twelve weeks to go faster, to hit more milestones, to 
do more things, to have more externally obvious achievements.  
 
Although InnoTech had originally chosen its twelve-week structure in imitation of 
another accelerator, the Management Team had come to believe that it was the 
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appropriate length: it was long enough that the entrepreneurs could make progress on 
their businesses and develop their stories for investors, but short enough that they would 
feel the necessary sense of urgency. For instance, one Administrative Assistant contended 
that a six-month program would not produce the same accelerating effects:  
Going longer might just extend that (time) a little too long where they start to feel 
comfortable. I think that the immediacy wouldn’t kick in until three months (were 
left). They might have the (first) three months where it is calm, cool and collected 
and then, ‘Oh crap!’.  
 
Imbuing the timeframe with significance. To infuse the twelve-week timeframe 
of its program with significance, InnoTech scheduled a major event for the last week of 
each of its program sessions: Investor Day. This event—during which the entrepreneurs 
pitched four-minute versions of their stories to an invited audience of investors—was 
characterized as the entrepreneurs’ best chance to initiate conversations about funding. 
According to the Director, when a company graduated from the accelerator program, that 
company enjoyed a brief moment of attention and legitimacy that made it easier for them 
to secure funding: “You have this opportunity at the end of an accelerator to use that 
credibility in that moment (to hook investors).”  
By telling the entrepreneurs that Investor Day would take place at the close of the 
twelve weeks, and underscoring that they should be ready to impress investors on that 
day, InnoTech magnified the significance of the twelve-week timeframe. They 
established the final week not just as the close of a period of work delineated by the start 
and end dates of the program, but also as a deadline with implications for the 
entrepreneurs’ abilities to fundraise, and therefore succeed in their efforts to build new 
ventures. Having such a deadline, InnoTech felt, was key to getting the entrepreneurs to 
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work rapidly on making progress on their businesses and developing their stories for 
investors. As one Administrative Assistant asserted, Investor Day created anxiety, which 
motivated the entrepreneurs to work intensely over the twelve weeks of the InnoTech 
program: 
 (All) of (the entrepreneurs) have this big, culminating event at the end of the 
accelerator that they need to do well at regardless of their fundraising strategy... 
That stress of the deadline always coming (up at the end of the program) helps 
with keeping the teams focused on what they really need to focus on. 
 
One Lead Partner further explained that needing to prepare for the Investor Day pitch 
presentation pushed the entrepreneurs to tackle activities they might otherwise delay or 
avoid: 
The (Investor Day) presentation creates an urgency, which creates motivation to 
accomplish certain things, which allows people to overcome things they might not 
be good at. Like people may not be good at asking advisors whether they would 
join their team. They may have a fear of the person saying no. They may not have 
much personal experience doing it so they’re uncomfortable. A little bit of 
pressure helps people over the hump.  
 
Amplifying the Time Pressure 
 Second, InnoTech amplified the sense of time pressure—created by the Investor 
Day deadline—to propel the entrepreneurs to make progress on their businesses and 
develop compelling stories for investors by the end of the twelve-week program. The 
accelerator generated this additional pressure by reminding about time, scheduling 
checkpoints, comparing to peers, and scolding. 
 Reminding about time. The first way InnoTech created a sense of pressure was 
through reminders about time. These reminders were a way of establishing and 
maintaining a feeling of urgency, starting on day one of the accelerator program. At the 
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orientation on that day, the Director warned the entrepreneurs that the program would 
feel very brief: “Twelve weeks go by so fast! We’ll be sitting here after (the end), hung 
over, wondering where it went.”  
Most of InnoTech’s reminders about time involved specific references to how 
many weeks had already passed, and exhortations to work faster because Investor Day 
was quickly approaching. The Director often included such reminders in the emails she 
sent each week to the entrepreneurs. For example, one week she wrote: “Welcome to 
Week Six. Mind boggling to think that we are halfway through the session…. As we head 
into the second half of our time together, it's time to turn it up a notch!” The Management 
Team also conveyed reminders about time during group gatherings. For example, the 
Director told the entrepreneurs at one dinner session: Do you realize you’re almost ten 
percent done with your accelerator experience? (You’ll be) twelve days in soon. You 
only get twelve of these weeks… The calendar clock should always be in your head.” At 
another gathering, a Lead Partner commented: “It is Week Five, which is known as the 
first of the holy shit weeks... The second half of the program moves super fast.”  
 Scheduling checkpoints. The second way InnoTech created pressure was by 
scheduling checkpoints throughout the program. These checkpoints served as interim, 
mini-deadlines for the entrepreneurs. InnoTech expected that, if left to their own devices, 
the entrepreneurs would delay preparations for Investor Day until just before that event. 
The checkpoints helped prevent this, InnoTech believed, because they required the 
entrepreneurs to pitch their stories, and thereby reveal how much progress they were 
making on their businesses, in front of others.  
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The checkpoints at InnoTech included a midpoint Open House and bi-weekly 
pitch feedback sessions. At the Open House, the entrepreneurs pitched short versions of 
their stories to a large audience of potential investors, mentors, partners, and customers. 
InnoTech described this event as lower stakes than Investor Day, but emphasized to the 
entrepreneurs that performing well at it mattered in terms of making important 
connections and generating early interest among investors. Open House was the first time 
that the entrepreneurs pitched their stories publicly, and InnoTech used the event to push 
the entrepreneurs to figure out what their businesses were about, and how to convey that 
clearly to others. One Lead Partner commented:  
Open House is really designed around the thirty-second pitch… Being able to 
communicate (the business) clearly in a way that the average person will 
understand… Open House kind of becomes that end cap point where they have to 
do the thirty-second pitch, so they had better figure out what the hell they are 
doing (in their businesses). 
 
Hoping that establishing Open House as an interim deadline would galvanize the 
entrepreneurs to work on their businesses and stories early on in the program—and thus 
ensure that they would be ready for Investor Day—the Management Team often referred 
to Open House during the first half of the program. For instance, during the fourth week 
of the program, one Lead Partner told the entrepreneurs: “In two weeks there will be the 
Open House. Three hundred people will be here, and you’ll be pitching. Get ready!”.  
The second type of checkpoint that InnoTech scheduled to create pressure were 
the bi-weekly pitch feedback sessions. During these sessions—which were less public 
and far more informal than Open House—the entrepreneurs received critical, no-holds-
barred feedback, in front of their peers, from the InnoTech Management Team and an 
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invited guest speaker. InnoTech believed the entrepreneurs would work on their 
businesses and stories in advance of each pitch feedback session to avoid being criticized 
in front of their peers and guest speakers. InnoTech emphasized to the entrepreneurs that 
performing well at these sessions would prevent humiliation, as well as help them build 
their businesses. The Director once told the entrepreneurs: “(Speakers) will judge you (at 
these sessions). So you don’t want to suck… It’s embarrassing not to be prepared with 
high profile (speakers) here. So try to be your best self.” A Lead Partner added: “It really 
does matter. It affects whether someone leaves the building and says something good 
about your company.” 
 Checkpoints like Open House and the bi-weekly pitch feedback sessions also lent 
structure and order to the InnoTech program. InnoTech believed the entrepreneurs would 
accomplish more if its program were organized in a predicable, clear manner. As one 
Lead Partner explained, rather than letting the weeks leading up to Investor Day pass by 
undifferentiated, InnoTech punctuated the twelve weeks with events, so that the program 
“(didn’t) look like anarchy”. The Director described the use of checkpoints to organize 
the twelve weeks of the program as “time boxing.” She pointed out that the Open House 
marked the midpoint, organizing the program into two equal halves, and the pitch 
feedback sessions recurred twice each week, at the same times. 
Comparing to peers. The third way that InnoTech created pressure was by using 
the cohort structure of the accelerator to create friendly rivalry (or “co-opetition”; Cohen, 
2013b) among the entrepreneurs. The companies were not in direct competition with one 
another, since they were all developing different products and services. However, 
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InnoTech believed that if the entrepreneurs perceived that their peers were advancing 
more quickly than they were, it would push them to work faster themselves. As one Lead 
Partner said: “No one in (this) environment wants to be left behind.” Another Lead 
Partner elaborated: 
It’s…positive peer pressure, like: ‘Crap that guy looks really good.’ … Like: ‘I’ve 
got to do better because I’m going to look like a schmo if I get up there and I’m 
the only one with a crappy presentation.’… ‘I need to be in the same league as 
they are.’ … We put the pressure on in that way. 
 
InnoTech made the entrepreneurs aware of each other’s accomplishments by 
asking members of the cohort to update each other at group gatherings. For example, at 
the start of one pitch feedback session, one of the Lead Partners asked the entrepreneurs 
to share good news from the prior week. Several of the entrepreneurs volunteered 
information such as new customers they had signed, meetings with potential investors, 
and product launches. InnoTech also facilitated knowledge of peer accomplishments 
through the bi-weekly pitch feedback sessions. As the individual entrepreneurs made 
progress, this progress was reflected and conveyed to their peers in their pitches.  
InnoTech also made use of peer comparison at the bi-weekly pitch feedback 
sessions to pressure the entrepreneurs to improve their stories for investors. Often, 
InnoTech simply provided targeted feedback to each entrepreneur, making it clear which 
pitches the Management Team thought were better. For example, at one session, a panel 
of “judges”—consisting of two Lead Partners and a guest speaker—evaluated whether 
each pitch was “hot” or “not”. At other times, InnoTech compared the pitches more 
explicitly. For instance, at the end of one session, the InnoTech Management Team chose 
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a “best” pitch and awarded the winning company a private meeting with an influential 
entrepreneur. 
Scolding. The final way that InnoTech created pressure was by scolding the 
entrepreneurs when they were moving too slowly. As the Director described, InnoTech 
reprimanded the entrepreneurs if they were not making progress fast enough on their 
businesses: “We’ll be like: ‘Do you want to win? Do you want to lose? If you want to get 
here, you have to go faster.’” One Lead Partner recounted a specific time when the 
Management Team took a subgroup of entrepreneurs out to dinner to talk to them about 
their poor performance: “We said: ‘We have called you all here because you are all 
sucking right now.’ … We felt like we should sit down and really address it.”  
InnoTech also scolded the entrepreneurs if the stories they told in their pitches 
were not improving fast enough. For example, after one pitch presentation practice 
session, one of the Lead Partners and the Director informed the assembled entrepreneurs 
that their pitches were not good enough, and that they needed to get much better: 
We’re two weeks away from the Open House. And the pitches are not good 
enough… You need to spend thirty minutes on this every day… If I were an 
investor, and I am, I would not be writing any checks tonight. 
 
One of the Administrative Assistants explained that scolding the entrepreneurs 
about the state of their stories was something that the Lead Partners did intentionally, 
often at the same point in each session—a couple of weeks before Open House—to get 
them to work harder on their pitches: 
It starts out very causally (each time). The Lead Partner is sort of pulling out her 
mean face: ‘You need to work on this. It’s not that bad and this is what you should 
do.’ Then it becomes: ‘You need to work on this. You need to work on it now.’ It 
definitely switches. They’re at the point now where there’s no time left… The 
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Lead Partner makes it pretty clear: ‘This is the end. You are at the end. You 
needed to be here a week ago.’ She makes it pretty clear at this point that it’s not 
okay to not be presentable. I think hearing her turn like that makes them think, ‘I 
really better work.’ 
 
Providing Concentrated Resources 
 Finally, InnoTech identified the resources they believed startups needed to 
succeed, and provided these resources in a more concentrated, rapid way than would 
occur outside of the accelerator. InnoTech expected that supplying a wealth of resources 
in a compressed time—and allowing the entrepreneurs to choose the ones they needed—
would enable them to work faster. As one Lead Partner stated: “I’ve used the metaphor 
oftentimes that InnoTech sets a buffet and we set it well. We encourage you to visit that 
buffet and eat from it a lot.” The Director elaborated on this notion: 
We set a buffet for you, but you have to figure out what to eat… There’s more 
coming out of the fire hose than you could ever drink. There are more resources 
on the table than you could ever implement right now.  
 
In keeping with the buffet metaphor, InnoTech offered the entrepreneurs many 
different resources, including a small amount of seed capital and pro bono legal services. 
However, there were three main types of resources that the accelerator offered: mentoring, 
making connections, and offering educational programming. 
 Mentoring. According to InnoTech, intense mentoring was crucial to acceleration 
because it helped the entrepreneurs identify and stay focused on their priorities, get help 
with encountered obstacles, and manage the stress generated by the program. The main 
source of mentoring at InnoTech was the entrepreneurs’ interactions with the Lead 
Partners. Each company was assigned one of the Lead Partners as its primary advisor. 
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Referring to his role as that of a “Sherpa,” one Lead Partner said: “It’s our job as Lead 
Partners to help to carry them through the program, when they need help.” Another Lead 
Partner described how she tried to point out problems and suggest solutions that the 
entrepreneurs might not arrive at on their own:  
I like to use the language of helping them see things that they can’t currently see. 
Whether that’s a solution to a problem, or somehow a way to crack the market, or 
some team issue that they’re not recognizing that they’re having. And whether 
that’s outright telling them, or…attempting to bring their own awareness to where 
they are.  
 
By bringing their perspectives and expertise to each company, the Lead Partners believed 
they would enable the entrepreneurs to figure out their priorities and work more quickly 
on those priorities. One commented that that she “help(ed) teams overcome their 
struggles faster than they would if they weren’t doing the accelerator.” 
 InnoTech also provided mentoring through interactions with other members of the 
Management Team. In particular, the non-Lead Partner members of the Management 
Team offered emotional support if they sensed that the entrepreneurs were finding the 
program stressful. InnoTech believed that this prevented the entrepreneurs’ emotions 
from getting in the way of their ability to make progress. As one Administrative Assistant 
remarked: “We try to check in and say, ‘Is everything going okay? Do you need 
anything?’”. The Director elaborated on this idea, explaining how her mentoring role was 
often more about dealing with personal than with business issues: “I’ve been meditating a 
lot just on how human it is... Coaching startups is not really much about business 
advice… It’s tackling whatever’s behind the tactical problem.”  
 InnoTech encouraged the entrepreneurs to expand their mentoring relationships 
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beyond the Management Team. They focused most on fostering mentoring relationships 
towards the beginning of each session, through a five-day activity called mentor speed 
dating. During each of these five days, the entrepreneurs met with eight people in the 
“extended” InnoTech community, in rapid (twenty-minute), back-to-back meetings. One 
of the primary goals of these meetings was to forge new mentoring relationships that 
would help the entrepreneurs advance their businesses. 
 InnoTech also urged the entrepreneurs to mentor each other. Each entrepreneur 
had different backgrounds and skills, so InnoTech believed they could offer each other 
different types of help. For instance, the Management Team suggested that the 
entrepreneurs consult one particular company about tracking business analytics, because 
that company was seen as particularly strong in that area. 
Making connections. InnoTech also provided numerous connections to people 
outside of the accelerator. By providing introductions to a wide range of potentially 
useful advisors, mentors, partners, customers, and investors, InnoTech believed that it 
was increasing the likelihood that the entrepreneurs would find the key people they 
needed to build their businesses quickly. One of the Administrative Assistants explained 
this strategy: 
(We) try to pack the room with as many people as possible and then hope that a 
couple people in that room will see something in the company… Providing the 
intros…is really what is going to propel that team forward and help make them 
take those really big steps that an accelerator hopefully provides.  
 
One of the Lead Partners also emphasized the importance of making connections: “All of 
those (meetings) are collisions of human beings that are learning points and potential 
future value points for startups.”  
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InnoTech created new connections in three different ways. First, it provided 
tailored introductions to people who could help the entrepreneurs with different facets of 
their businesses. As one of the Lead Partners said: “I’ll hook them (the entrepreneurs) up 
to somebody who I think is important. I’ll be a connector.” For example, one Lead 
Partner introduced a team of entrepreneurs to a local manufacturer whom she thought 
might be able to improve the company’s packaging. Second, InnoTech organized large-
scale public events—Open House and Investor Day—to attract people who might 
potentially be useful to one or more of the companies. At these events, InnoTech 
scheduled time for informal conversations and networking, hoping that some of these 
discussions would turn into useful relationships for the entrepreneurs. Third, as described 
earlier, InnoTech held five days of mandatory mentor speed dating. Mentor speed dating 
facilitated meetings with approximately forty people over the course of several days. 
InnoTech expected the entrepreneurs would forge at least a few valuable, lasting 
relationships from those forty different meetings.  
Offering educational programming. InnoTech provided educational 
programming to help the entrepreneurs learn about key aspects of venture creation, and 
thereby make progress more quickly on their businesses and story development. These 
educational opportunities were in the form of guest speaker presentations—which were 
mandatory and took place as part of the bi-weekly pitch feedback sessions—and optional 
workshops. The guest speakers were usually local entrepreneurs who offered different 
perspectives on how to create and run successful startups. One Administrative Assistant 
explained why InnoTech thought hearing different perspectives was important: 
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I think being there (at the speaker presentations)…gives you a good, broad idea 
of different thoughts on how to think outside the box… It gives you a different way 
to look at something. I think it’s really important to go to all of them if only to get 
another perspective. 
 
The optional workshops were focused on helping the entrepreneurs work on 
specific aspects of their businesses, in a hands-on way. For instance, InnoTech held a 
three-part workshop on user experience, wherein each company got feedback from an 
expert on its current product design and advice about how to improve it. In another 
workshop, a theater professional helped the entrepreneurs work on their pitch delivery.  
 
DISCUSSION 
The analysis presented in this chapter contributes to several streams of 
scholarship on time. First, in line with the research question that motivated this chapter, 
the analysis expands our understanding of the tactics organizations use to pursue 
acceleration. Second, the chapter extends conversations about time as a form of control. 
Third, this chapter spotlights localized assumptions about time in specific settings, and 
the relationship of such assumptions to organizational attempts to direct and organize 
members’ work. I discuss each of these three contributions, in turn, below. 
 
Organizational Use of Acceleration Tactics 
This chapter augments knowledge about organizations’ attempts to increase 
people’s work tempos. It expands our understanding beyond deadlines, revealing that 
organizations draw on a varied and complex set of tactics in the service of acceleration. 
In doing so, the chapter extends theories of temporal pacing: it shows how non-deadline 
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acceleration tactics may be used to complement and support the use of deadlines as 
temporal pacers. 
 Looking beyond deadlines. Although a robust literature explores how 
organizations impose deadlines to accelerate work (Gersick, 1988, 1989; Lim & 
Murnighan, 1994; Waller et al., 2002), we know little about additional tactics that 
managers employ. InnoTech certainly set a deadline (i.e., Investor Day, at the end of the 
twelve-week program) to influence the entrepreneurs’ pace of work. However, setting a 
deadline was only one element in a broader set of tactics that the accelerator used to 
generate and maintain a rapid work tempo. These included some that were overtly 
temporal in nature—such as frequent reminders about the passage of time—and those 
that were more subtly temporal—such as providing concentrated, rapid connections to 
potentially useful people.  
By elaborating InnoTech’s acceleration tactics, I extend understanding of the 
complex, wide range of practices that organizations may use in service of eliciting greater 
speed. In doing so, I build on a handful of studies that have looked beyond deadlines to 
illuminate that managers may pursue acceleration by manipulating scheduling (Perlow, 
1998), assignments (Perlow, 1998), policies (Perlow, 1998), rewards (Perlow, 1999), 
employee identities (Kunda, 1992; Shih, 2004), and norms (Casey, 1995; Fleming & 
Spicer, 2004). Similarly to Perlow (1998), I found that InnoTech used scheduling—of 
interim checkpoints—and rewards—in the form of positive comparison to peers and 
praise—to catalyze a faster speed of work. However, I also identified additional tactics 
that have not previously been discussed in the literature, including reminders about time 
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and intensified provision of resources such as mentoring, connections, and educational 
programming. 
Temporal pacing: deadline as well as non-deadline approaches. Prior research 
(Gersick, 1988, 1989; Karau & Kelly, 1992; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Moore & Tenney, 
2012; Okhuysen, 2001; Parks & Cowlin, 1995; Waller et al., 2002) has pointed to 
temporal pacing as a key mechanism by which deadlines generate greater speed. More 
specifically, scholars contend that deadlines serve as temporal pacers. As I explained in 
the Introduction (Chapter 1), temporal pacers are used to push people to adjust the rate at 
which they work in order to align task completion with the timing of the pacer (Ancona 
& Chong, 1996; Gersick, 1988, 1989, 1994; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983; Okhuysen & 
Waller, 2002). According to entrainment theory (Ancona & Chong, 1996; McGrath & 
Rotchford, 1983), temporal pacers are rooted in cycles and rhythms that are external to 
but influence the work that is being done. An example of a temporal pacer is the 
academic semester in universities: the semester system is not required by academic work, 
but its existence plays a significant role in terms of when professors teach, do research, 
and travel to conferences. In the case of InnoTech, the end of the accelerator program—
and specifically the event that coincided with this end (i.e., Investor Day)—served as a 
temporal pacer. The Investor Day event was a recurring event for InnoTech: it took place 
twice a year, at the termination of each program session. It thus represented a “rhythmic 
stimulus” for the entrepreneurs at InnoTech (Ancona & Chong, 1996). 
Although the extant literature on temporal pacing in organizations has focused on 
how pacers—such as recurring deadlines or scheduled events—in the environment 
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“capture” and thus influence work behavior, the findings presented in this chapter suggest 
that temporal pacing may also be linked to other acceleration tactics used by 
organizations. InnoTech scheduled Investor Day, thus creating a key temporal pacer for 
the entrepreneurs, but it also employed additional tactics (i.e., amplifying the time 
pressure and providing concentrated resources) to strengthen the entraining “pull” of that 
pacer. By combining a deadline with other acceleration tactics, InnoTech sought to 
modify the founders’ behavior more effectively, to align with the timing of Investor Day. 
 
Time as a Form of Control 
This chapter also advances knowledge about how time may serve as a form of 
control in organizations. As Fine noted, organizations “set the temporal dimensions of 
work, to which workers must adjust and negotiate” (1990: 95). In his study of restaurants, 
Fine (1990) concluded that temporal aspects of the work being done constrained 
organizational members’ activities in significant ways. For instance, the ebb and flow of 
customer demand directly influenced the shifts to which workers were assigned. 
Furthermore, unexpected peaks and valleys in customer demand gave managers the 
power to alter workers’ schedules without notice. Similarly, in his well-known study of 
factory work, Roy (1960) observed that managers exerted control over their workers by 
tightly structuring their time. Finally, although he did not frame his research in terms of 
organizational control, Zerubavel (1979) noted a link between the temporal nature of 
work and people’s rhythms in his study of hospitals. For instance, he found that 
differences in “daytime” and “nighttime” patient care shaped how shifts were assigned.  
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My research extends this stream of research by explaining how InnoTech 
employed temporality to control how the entrepreneurs organized their work: through the 
use of the acceleration tactics described in this chapter, the InnoTech Management Team 
mandated that the entrepreneurs engage in certain activities at specific points over the 
course of twelve weeks. Unlike what Fine (1990) observed in the restaurants he studied, 
however, I found that temporal control at InnoTech was relatively divorced from the 
nature of work itself: the entrepreneurs’ work—of creating new ventures—did not 
necessitate the temporal pattern required by InnoTech. In other words, InnoTech 
manufactured the rapid work tempo at the core of its program. The accelerator’s use of 
temporal control thus seems more similar to what researchers have previously observed 
in other organizations engaged in knowledge or creative work. In these organizations, the 
nature of the work often did not require that it be completed according to a particular 
temporal pattern. However, the managers used subtle approaches to control members’ 
work. Perlow (1998) found that managers employed a number of approaches—such as 
scheduling meetings, restricting vacations, and monitoring the number of hours each 
engineer worked—to push software engineers to be present at the office at specific times. 
Shih (2004) concluded that managers propagated and drew on the idea that high-skilled 
employees in Silicon Valley needed to work long hours in order to remain marketable 
and achieve wealth in their careers:  
Individuals are encouraged to behave as capitalists, putting in limitless hours for 
the possibility of increasing rewards. This ideology functions as an effective mode 
of control because it posits this labor as being in the worker’s own interest, as an 
entrepreneurial activity rather than one embedded within relations of control. 
(241) 
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In both Perlow and Shih’s studies, and as was the case at InnoTech, managers’ 
manipulations of work hours were not necessitated by the nature of the work, but rather 
were imposed by the organization to regulate the amount (i.e., how much) and timing (i.e., 
when) of members’ work.  
 
Localized Assumptions About Acceleration 
This chapter adds nuance to our understanding of organizational assumptions 
about time, and how those assumptions shape how organizations direct their members’ 
work. First, the chapter highlights the ways in which specific, localized beliefs about time 
are undergirded but not dictated by an organization’s broad temporal assumptions. As the 
preceding sections make clear, InnoTech held a basic assumption about time: it believed 
that moving more quickly increased a new venture’s chances of survival and success. 
InnoTech could have made this belief—in the power of acceleration—concrete in many 
different ways. For instance, it could have concentrated on speeding up product testing. 
Or, it could have emphasized rapid product development (e.g., coding/programming). 
However, InnoTech defined acceleration in terms of securing funding. Although this 
approach was clearly rooted in the organization’s fundamental notion that faster was 
better, it was not the only possible way to accelerate new ventures. This finding 
underscores that basic temporal assumptions, which are often shared across 
organizations—after all, many companies view acceleration as crucial to success—carry 
distinct meanings depending on the particular setting (Dubinskas, 1988a). Although the 
extant literature as a whole points to the situated nature of acceleration, individual 
	  	  
65 
scholars have not explicitly discussed localized assumptions about and approaches to 
increasing speed in their research. 
Second, this chapter shows empirically that an organization’s localized beliefs 
about time shape how it directs its members’ work (van den Scott, 2014). If InnoTech 
had, as suggested above, emphasized product testing, the accelerator would likely have 
instructed the entrepreneurs to spend their time getting and incorporating feedback from 
users. To this end, they might have created frequent opportunities for the entrepreneurs to 
speak with, and get feedback from, a pool of dedicated product testers. If InnoTech had 
focused on product development, it would probably have told the entrepreneurs to 
prioritize programming and design work. To support the entrepreneurs’ activities, 
InnoTech might have offered—as some accelerators do—free programming support from 
a cadre of expert coders. However, as described above, InnoTech applied the notion of 
acceleration to the timing of fundraising, and thus required that the entrepreneurs invest 
their time in making progress on their businesses—specifically in terms of gaining 
traction—and developing compelling stories for fundraising. To push the entrepreneurs to 
concentrate on these two types of work, InnoTech employed a customized set of tactics: 
it imposed a deadline (i.e., twelve weeks) and associated that deadline with a significant 
fundraising event (i.e., Investor Day). InnoTech’s ways of amplifying pressure and 
providing concentrated resources were also influenced by the organization’s application 
of acceleration to funding. For instance, the accelerator put pressure on the entrepreneurs 
to improve their investor stories, and offered connections it believed would help the 
entrepreneurs get customers. 
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CHAPTER 4: TEMPORAL AND EVENT-BASED PACING 
The prior chapter (Chapter 3) described the complex set of tactics that InnoTech 
used to accelerate entrepreneurs’ work, in service of getting them to get funding sooner. 
Pace, however, was not the only aspect of work that InnoTech prescribed. InnoTech also 
stipulated the sequence of work: as I explained in Chapter 3, the accelerator told the 
entrepreneurs that they needed to make progress on their businesses—demonstrate that 
their products or services had traction in the market—before seeking funding. By setting 
both a rapid, twelve-week pace and a specific order of work activities, InnoTech implied 
simultaneously that moving to fundraising should be triggered temporally—by reaching a 
particular point in time (Investor Day)—and sequentially—by achieving sufficient 
progress to attract investors. 
In this chapter, I consider the ways in which InnoTech’s mandates about time and 
sequence shaped the entrepreneurs’ experiences and work, thus addressing my research 
question: how does an organization’s approach to acceleration shape its members’ 
experiences and work? I begin by explaining how InnoTech established two different—
and potentially conflicting—types of triggers for fundraising: one temporal and one 
sequential. Next, I discuss how working within the constraints of both types of triggers 
generated either a sense of synchrony or a sense of asynchrony for the entrepreneurs. I 
then explore the implications of synchrony and asynchrony for how the entrepreneurs 
planned and approached their work during the twelve weeks of the InnoTech program. 
The analysis in this chapter foregrounds the individual entrepreneurs participating 
in the InnoTech program. However, as I examine how being embedded in InnoTech’s 
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environment of mandated acceleration shaped the entrepreneurs’ experiences and work, I 
also take into account an additional contextual layer: that of the founders’ respective 
companies5. This approach is appropriate because the entrepreneurs’ responses were 
shaped in important ways by the unique situations and trajectories of their ventures.  
Although my analysis is informed by data spanning both sessions of the 
accelerator program, the data presented below come from the fourteen companies that 
allowed me mid- or full-level access6 during the second session of the InnoTech program 
that I studied. I focus on these data because they provide rich, longitudinal accounts of 
the entrepreneurs’ experiences and work choices.  
 
TIME- AND EVENT-BASED TRIGGERS FOR FUNDRAISING 
 Through the acceleration tactics that it employed, InnoTech mandated that time 
should prompt the start of fundraising for the entrepreneurs participating in its program. 
By structuring the sessions to last twelve weeks, and by scheduling Investor Day—which 
the accelerator framed as the entrepreneurs’ best chance to attract investors—at the end 
of those twelve weeks, InnoTech established that the passage of time should dictate when 
the entrepreneurs sought funding. However, the accelerator also constructed a non-
temporal, work-based catalyst for fundraising: making progress on their businesses. As I 
described in Chapter 3, InnoTech communicated constantly to the entrepreneurs that they 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It is important to note that the ventures at InnoTech were not full-fledged organizations in the 
traditional sense. Rather, they consisted of one to three (but usually two) founders. 
 
6 As I explained in the Methods chapter, mid-level access meant I could speak informally with the 
entrepreneurs and interview them at scheduled times. Full-level access allowed me additional 
permission to shadow the entrepreneurs, in their offices and elsewhere. 
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needed to make substantial progress—in the form of gaining market traction (i.e., 
acquiring customers)—before approaching investors for money. Achieving such progress 
was described as the best way to convince investors that a new venture had tested and 
proven its business model.  
 InnoTech thus prescribed two different ways of thinking about when to start 
fundraising: one rooted in time—based on the twelve-week length of the program and 
coinciding Investor Day event—and one rooted in sequence—based on making sufficient 
progress to persuade investors to provide funding. Whereas the first approach reflects the 
concept of temporal pacing, the second represents the notion of event-based pacing 
(Gersick, 1994). According to theories of temporal pacing, stimuli in the external 
environment serve as “time givers” (Ancona & Chong, 1996), or time-based triggers 
(Gersick, 1994), that shape when people working in that environment act. In the case of 
InnoTech, Investor Day was a time-based trigger: it recurred regularly (twice a year) as 
part of the organization’s annual rhythm of scheduled sessions, and represented a 
prominent temporal stimulus in the environment for the entrepreneurs who went through 
the accelerator program. 
In contrast to temporal pacing, wherein action is triggered at specific points in 
time (i.e., like an alarm clock), event-based pacing is like a “thermostat” (Gersick, 1994: 
33): the occurrence or achievement of one “event” pushes people to turn their attention to 
a new task that is made more relevant or possible based on completing the previous task. 
Event-based pacing is congruent with the notion of sequence, which applies to work 
situations wherein tasks must be accomplished in a specific, irreversible order (Albert, 
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2013; Ancona, Okhuysen, et al., 2001). Although the label “event” may seem to imply 
scheduling, event-based triggers (Gersick, 1994) are not linked to time. Instead, events 
take place as tasks and projects unfold, at points that are not predetermined or linked to a 
calendar. Examples of event-based triggers abound in and outside of organizations. For 
instance, in universities, academic researchers generally submit their manuscripts to peer-
reviewed journals after their studies have been completed, and their manuscripts have 
been written; finishing the research, rather than reaching a specific date, prompts 
submission. At InnoTech, the accelerator’s identification of traction as a necessary 
precursor to fundraising is in line with the concept of an event-based trigger. InnoTech 
mandated an immutable sequence of work: the entrepreneurs needed to make progress on 
their businesses before seeking funding. In other words, making progress, or gaining 
traction, was the trigger that would enable the start of fundraising. 
To illustrate more clearly the difference between temporal and event-based pacing, 
consider a technology company that is preparing to launch a new smartphone app. If the 
company acts according to temporal pacing, it will likely choose a specific date for the 
launch that aligns with a temporal pacer in the environment. For example, it might time 
the launch to coincide with a major annual conference, in order to attract more attention 
from industry analysts. If, however, the company acts according to event-based pacing, it 
will likely launch its app when certain tasks have been completed (e.g., the app is 
completely debugged) or milestones are reached (e.g., the online store approves the app 
for sale to consumers). 
In sum, InnoTech created two different types of triggers for starting fundraising: a 
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time-based trigger, Investor Day, and an event-based trigger, achieving market traction. 
The entrepreneurs participating in InnoTech’s program were thus operating against the 
backdrop of both temporal and event-based pacing; they were instructed to begin 
fundraising at the end of the twelve-week program, but they were also told that they 
needed to make significant progress on their businesses before seeking funding. In the 
next section, I explain how the entrepreneurs perceived and experienced the coexistence 
of time- and event-based triggers at InnoTech.  
 
PERCEIVED COMPATIBILITY OF TIME- AND EVENT-BASED TRIGGERS:  
SENSE OF SYNCHRONY OR ASYNCHRONY 
 Theoretically, to adapt their work to both the time- and the event-based triggers 
imposed by InnoTech, the entrepreneurs needed to achieve sufficient traction within the 
twelve weeks of the program, in time to persuade investors on Investor Day. Doing so 
would permit congruence between the two types of triggers, by ensuring that the timing 
of fundraising made sense in the context of both triggers: the entrepreneurs would be 
approaching investors after having completed the required precursor step (gaining 
traction) and on the specific date set by the accelerator. InnoTech—with its strong belief 
in the power of acceleration—claimed that greater speed was the key to such congruence: 
if the entrepreneurs worked intensely enough, the organization contended, they should be 
able to gain traction within twelve weeks, and thus persuade investors to consider funding 
their ventures.  
 The reality for the entrepreneurs, however, was more complex and less certain. 
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Working intensely did not guarantee that they would gain traction within InnoTech’s 
predetermined twelve-week timeframe. First, as other researchers have reported (Bird, 
1988; Gersick, 1994; Liao, Welsch, & Tan, 2005; Liao et al., 2005; Lounsbury & Glynn, 
2001, 2001; McClelland, 1986; Morris, Kuratko, Schindehutte, & Spivack, 2012; Peters, 
Rice, & Sundararajan, 2004), the nature of the entrepreneurs’ work was such that it was 
often difficult for them to predict, or control, exactly when they would be able to 
demonstrate traction. They often encountered unforeseen obstacles, or made shifts 
(“pivots”) in their business models based on learning new information. When the 
entrepreneurs had to deal with unexpected problems or address newly uncovered 
complexities, this delayed them in terms of gaining traction. For instance, several weeks 
into the InnoTech program, the founders of PayO realized that, contrary to their 
expectations, they could not create a straightforward rental payment platform. Instead, 
they had to incorporate elements of risk management for landlords, in addition to 
providing a payment service. This meant adding different features to their product, which 
made it more difficult and time consuming to build, and thus forced them to postpone 
their efforts to seek and sign up landlord users. Similarly, the entrepreneurs working on 
TixGo arrived at an unexpected realization about their business partway through the 
InnoTech program. As the CEO of the company explained: 
We thought (when we started the program) we were going be a ticketing service. 
We are not going be a ticketing service. We learned in a variety of ways that this 
was the wrong thing to do for the problem we are trying to solve. 
 
The entrepreneurs’ trajectories toward traction were also hard to foresee because 
their work tended to be ambiguous and complex; the path toward launching their 
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products and services was often unclear. Even though the entrepreneurs understood that 
InnoTech’s goal for them was to acquire customers, they at times did not know how to 
accomplish that goal, or even what that goal meant for their specific companies. For 
example, the FotoZap Cofounder wondered what his company should aim for in terms of 
customer acquisition by Investor Day:  
It might help if we actually set a real goal for Investor Day… We have a general 
idea, like, ‘Okay, we need to increase subscribers and increase sign-ups.’ 
Obviously. By Investor Day we want to have twenty-five thousand users? What 
does that even mean? I don’t know. It’s hard to put a finger on. 
 
The FotoZap CEO went on to admit that he also did not know how to go about increasing 
the company’s subscriber base: “We know we need to do X to get more people, more 
startups, more whatever. But how we go about doing X, we’re still kind of unsure about.” 
Second, each company participating in the InnoTech program faced a different set 
of challenges and opportunities that influenced its founders’ path toward traction within 
the twelve-week program timeframe. Perhaps most notably, the companies were at 
different stages in the process of new venture creation. Some (e.g., GameB) entered the 
program with already-launched products or services and a few customers, some (e.g., 
FanCraze) had developed demo prototypes, and some (e.g., ScienceEd) had little more 
than ideas jotted down on paper. In addition, the companies had varying types of business 
models, and therefore customers. For instance, the founders of VidAds were trying to 
launch a business-to-business video service, while the founders of FanCraze were 
developing a platform where enthusiasts could get advance notice about upcoming 
releases. These two companies were targeting not only different industries—video 
advertising versus video gaming—but also different types of customers—enterprise 
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versus consumer.  
These differences in company stage and business model had implications for the 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to achieve traction prior to Investor Day. Entrepreneurs who 
entered with only an idea, or even a prototype, had to develop and launch a functional 
product or service before they could sign up users. In contrast, entrepreneurs with 
launched products or services were already ready to acquire customers when they entered 
the program. The nature of each company’s product or service also played a part in that 
company’s path toward traction. For example, because they were creating a business-to-
business enterprise, customer acquisition for the founders of VidAds meant convincing a 
few executives to sign large contracts. In contrast, the entrepreneurs developing FanCraze 
needed to acquire a large number of lower paying consumer customers. Although VidAds 
needed to get fewer users, the high cost of its product meant that it took the company 
many weeks to secure a single customer contract. 
 The unpredictable and ambiguous nature of venture creation, as well as the 
differences across companies in terms of their stage and business models, contributed to 
varying perceptions of compatibility between the time- and event-based triggers that 
InnoTech established for fundraising. As Figure 4.1 depicts, some entrepreneurs saw the 
two triggers as compatible. These entrepreneurs experienced a sense of synchrony. In 
contrast, other entrepreneurs perceived the two triggers as incompatible. These 
entrepreneurs felt a sense of asynchrony. Synchrony and asynchrony emerged from the 
data as individual level constructs. However, I found that each team of entrepreneurs 
working on particular venture shared a sense of synchrony or asynchrony. That is, there 
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were no companies within which the entrepreneurs had differing perceptions of the two 
types of triggers. This is not surprising, given the influence that each venture had on its 
founding entrepreneurs’ perceptions and experiences.  
Table 4.1 shows a breakdown of the entrepreneurs, by company, who participated 
in the second session of InnoTech that I studied, according to whether they experienced a 
sense of synchrony or asynchrony. As the table illustrates, I found that the founders of 
four of the fourteen companies saw the triggers as compatible and therefore experienced 
synchrony, and the founders of the ten other companies perceived the triggers as 
incompatible, and thus felt a sense of asynchrony.  
It is important to note that a company’s stage appeared to contribute to but did not 
determine whether the entrepreneurs working on that company felt a sense of synchrony 
or asynchrony. Although one might assume that entrepreneurs working on a venture that 
had made more progress prior to starting the InnoTech program—i.e., if their company 
was ready to acquire customers—the mere fact of being further along was not predictive 
of how the entrepreneurs perceived the compatibility of InnoTech’s time- and event-
based triggers. For instance, although FotoZap and PlayBox were more advanced than 
some of the other companies in their cohort—both had launched products and secured a 
few customers before entering the InnoTech program—the founders of those companies 
experienced a sense of asynchrony. Similarly, the entrepreneurs working on TopHire 
experienced a sense of synchrony, despite the fact that their company consisted of little 
more than an idea when its founders began the InnoTech program. 
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Sense of Synchrony  
There were four companies whose founders perceived the two InnoTech-
prescribed triggers as compatible: ClothYo, GameB, InfluenceX, and TopHire. This 
group of entrepreneurs saw InnoTech’s time and event-based triggers for fundraising as 
aligned, rather than in conflict with one another, and thus experienced a sense of 
synchrony. Entrepreneurs in this group saw the time constraint set by InnoTech—twelve 
weeks—as a good fit with their company’s timeframe for fundraising: they expected that 
they would be able to achieve enough traction during the InnoTech program to warrant 
approaching investors. For example, the founders of InfluenceX said that raising money 
at the end of the program matched their own fundraising timetable. As the Cofounder 
explained: 
We applied because we felt like we were far enough in our development from a 
product standpoint that (the InnoTech program) was something we could really 
use to help us get to the next level and get…funding ready. 
 
Similarly, the Cofounder of GameB remarked that the twelve-week timeframe was 
appropriate, given what his company needed to accomplish before seeking funding: “We 
are looking for growth funding, that is the primary objective…by the end of the 
program… (Twelve weeks) is the right amount of time.” 
As they moved through the InnoTech program, the entrepreneurs who felt a sense 
of synchrony were generally satisfied with the progress they were making on their 
businesses, and believed that they were on track to gain sufficient traction in time for 
Investor Day. For instance, the CEO of ClothYo asserted that his company’s website 
would certainly be functional by that point in time: “We will definitely have a working 
	  	  
76 
online marketplace at that point… Everything will be fine.” In another example, the 
Cofounder of GameB compared how much progress his company was making against the 
time that had elapsed in the InnoTech program, and saw them as aligned:  
We are halfway through (the program). We are actually halfway through in our 
core objectives. So it's kind of matching… We are meeting customers, meetings 
are going forward from the initial meeting… So now it's about signing deals. 
 
Similarly, several weeks into the program, the CEO of Influence X reported that he was 
shifting his attention to prepare for fundraising, based on the progress his company had 
already made in terms of getting customers: “In the time we've been here we've made so 
much significant traction…that we’re now shifting focus…to investing.” 
In line with their positive feelings about their ability to gain traction within twelve 
weeks, the entrepreneurs who felt a sense of synchrony were excited about presenting on 
Investor Day, and optimistic about their fundraising prospects. That is, as they looked 
ahead, they expected to be able to impress the audience at Investor Day, and thus kick off 
successful fundraising campaigns. As the CEO of InfluenceX said, expressing hopeful 
expectations about the outcome of Investor Day for his company: “I think (Investor Day) 
may be a very big celebration for us.” 
 
Sense of Asynchrony 
There were ten companies whose founders perceived incompatibility between the 
two InnoTech-prescribed triggers, and thus felt a sense of asynchrony: CodeJob, 
FanCraze, LivePlay, PayO, ScienceEd, SportsNow, FotoZap, PlayBox, TixGo, and 
VidAds. The entrepreneurs working on these ventures wondered whether, and doubted 
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that, they would be able to achieve enough traction within the twelve weeks of the 
InnoTech program to warrant passage to the fundraising phase of new venture creation. 
In other words, they saw InnoTech’s time- and event-based triggers for fundraising as 
misaligned and in conflict with one another.  
Entrepreneurs who experienced asynchrony felt uncertain and anxious about 
whether they would be able to gain the traction they needed by Investor Day. For instance, 
the Cofounder of VidAds explained that although he and his Cofounder were aware of 
what their company needed to achieve before Investor Day, they were unsure whether 
they would be able to accomplish it by that date:  
We need to be able to tell a story that we have momentum. So we need to sell our 
product, we need to finish building new product features… It's really hard to 
know (if we will get there in time)… it's really hard to know because we’re not a 
traditional kind of consumer, internet business, where you just have users, and 
you have a website, and people come to the website. There's a B2B or kind of like 
enterprise sales thing, which means that when we sell something it can be for a lot 
of money to a very big customer and that can be great. So your wins are like 
really touchdowns or home runs, but it also makes it harder to, it's hard to get 
those. So it's hard to say. I would love to say I have absolute confidence that we 
can sort of nail it… But we need to pull it together. 
 
The Cofounder of PayO also talked about how he and the company’s CEO did not know 
exactly what they would be able to achieve by the end of the InnoTech program: 
It will be either that we have a product and we don’t have a partnership, we don’t 
have a product yet but we are close to having a product, or we do have a product 
and we have a partnership. It could go either one of these ways.  
 
The entrepreneurs who experienced a sense of asynchrony generally felt 
dissatisfied with their progress as they moved through the InnoTech program. They 
talked about feeling “behind,” revealing a lack of confidence that they would have 
enough traction by Investor Day. Even if they thought that they were improving or 
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figuring out different aspects of their businesses, they feared they were not progressing 
rapidly enough given the twelve-week time constraint created by Investor Day. For 
instance, the CEO of PlayBox recognized that his company was making important 
advances, but could not appreciate those advances because he saw them as happening too 
slowly to benefit the company on Investor Day:  
I always feel like we’re behind… As the three months are happening, if you're not 
meeting (your) goals… (even if) you feel like you're doing a lot of good stuff, 
you’re making a lot of good progress, you’re building a lot of great 
relationships… Even though you feel like you've planted great seeds… That's the 
hard, stressful thing. 
 
In line with their negative feelings about making progress on acquiring customers, 
the entrepreneurs who felt a sense of asynchrony worried about their ability to impress 
the audience on Investor Day. For instance, as the Cofounder of TixGo explained during 
the week when Investor Day took place, he and the company CEO were worried that their 
lack of progress meant an inability to impress investors on Investor Day: 
(As we prepared), we kept wondering about how compelling our story would be…. 
We both felt a little bit uncomfortable about beginning a (fundraising) round at 
that exact moment because we didn’t feel like we had quite a compelling enough 
story… It would be awesome if we could have another two months to be even 
bigger and better and then go in front of investors. If it were my choice. I 
probably wouldn't have said, “Oh, (Investor Day) is totally the right time for us to 
go up in front of the investment community and say, ‘look, we're ready.'… That's 
one of the challenges with the accelerator program: it ends in three months no 
matter where you're at. 
 
The CEO of TixGo echoed his cofounder’s concerns about having enough traction to 
attract investors on Investor Day: “If I were an investor I don't think I would give us 
money… They don't have enough information to see that yet.” 
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Asynchrony Coping Strategies 
 As Figure 4.1 depicts, the entrepreneurs who experienced a sense of asynchrony 
coped with this feeling in one of two ways. Some entrepreneurs who perceived conflict 
between the two types of triggers “lived with” their feelings of asynchrony. That is, 
throughout the InnoTech program, they responded to both triggers: they continued trying 
to satisfy the requirements created by both the time- and the event-based triggers for 
fundraising, and thus remained mired in a feeling of tension. In contrast, another group of 
entrepreneurs lessened the asynchrony: they emphasized the event-based trigger, and let 
go of the time-based trigger, and its attendant temporal constraints.  
 Living with the asynchrony: Responding to both triggers. The founders of one 
subset of companies—which included FotoZap, PlayBox, TixGo, and VidAds—remained 
focused on trying to get traction in time for Investor Day, regardless of how difficult they 
felt it would be to accomplish that goal in the time remaining. That is, they tried to fulfill 
the demands placed by both the time- and the event-based trigger for fundraising, striving 
to achieve enough progress to make fundraising possible at the end of the twelve-week 
program. For instance, about five weeks before the end of the program, although the CEO 
of FotoZap expressed doubts about his company’s progress, he still saw Investor Day as 
the deadline for achieving traction: 
My (Investor Day) deck can’t be projection… It can’t be all hopes and dreams… I 
have to be able to say something like: ‘We doubled our customers in the past six 
weeks.’ I have to be able to go up there and say: ‘This is where we were at the 
beginning of the program and this is where we are at the end.’ … It has to be a lot 
more in terms of having actual, real customers… There is a limited amount of 
time… I am going to be on a platform with a slide deck in front of important 
people in five weeks and I can’t look like an idiot. There is just no way around it. 
There is no escaping it. There’s no waiting until tomorrow or waiting until next 
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week or procrastinating or whatever. It is going to happen whether we are ready 
or not. 
 
The CEO of PlayBox also simultaneously conveyed doubt about his company’s ability to 
make impressive progress by Investor Day, and a need to make traction happen by that 
date: 
You have these goals that you set for what you want to achieve in the three 
months… They have to be fulfilled by a certain date that's pretty quick… (But) 
you're not sure that it's going to be fruitful by (Investor Day). 
 
 As the quotes above suggest, the entrepreneurs who responded to both triggers 
sensed a clash between the time- and event-based triggers stipulated by InnoTech, but 
clung to the hope that they could persuade investors on Investor Day, having achieved 
sufficient traction by then. These entrepreneurs thus seemed to accept InnoTech’s claim 
that working faster would guarantee funding success: they hoped that if they worked 
intensely enough, somehow everything would align for their companies, and they would 
be ready to approach investors within the timeframe set by the accelerator. 
Lessening the asynchrony: Emphasizing the event-based trigger. Like the 
entrepreneurs who lived with the asynchrony, the entrepreneurs who lessened the 
asynchrony perceived conflict between the time- and event-based triggers mandated by 
InnoTech. However, unlike those who lived with the asynchrony, the entrepreneurs in 
this second subset of companies—which included CodeJob, FanCraze, LivePlay, PayO, 
ScienceEd, and SportsNow—ultimately decided that they could not—and should not—
respond to both triggers. Seeing it as unrealistic to expect that their companies would 
have enough traction by Investor Day to attract funders, these entrepreneurs abandoned 
the notion of Investor Day as the official start of their fundraising campaign. They 
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accepted InnoTech’s premise about sequence, and worked towards gaining traction in 
order to enable passage into the fundraising phase of venture creation. They saw this 
passage, however, as decoupled from the timing of the Investor Day event. 
For example, the Cofounder of FanCraze discussed how he and the company’s 
CEO realized that they were not meeting the customer targets that they had originally set 
for the end of the program. Although he expressed some disappointment about this, he 
explained that seeking funding at the end of the program was not necessarily the right 
timing for his company:  
We haven't really succeeded very much in the numbers we're trying to hit... We're 
sort of struggling... We came into it trying to figure out some things that we might 
be able to hit by the time we’re done, actionable numbers that will be very clean 
and concise, so we can say (on Investor Day), ‘We made improvements over this 
time.’... There are definitely no week by week changes in the numbers… We 
probably won't be able to hit (our numbers), but I'm not sure that's really 
necessarily important. I think we're definitely going to try to leave with a very 
solid vision and plan over the next six months or a year. We want to say this is 
sort of a very clear and solidified idea of how we're going to attack the problems 
that we're trying to solve with our company… We'll be okay if we don't 
necessarily have that clean ending like, ‘We made it through the program. Now 
we're (getting) money.” That's probably not going to happen. It's not the end of 
the world. 
 
The CEO of FanCraze shared similar thoughts about it not being the right time to start 
fundraising, because the business model was still in flux and the company did not yet 
need additional money: 
We still are not convinced of the need to raise money. It's kind of a nice to have, 
but we don't necessarily think we need it, or if this time is the right time to have it. 
Because we are still a bit experimental in some of our business model. 
 
 Similarly to the founders of FanCraze, the founders of LivePlay decided that 
conforming to InnoTech’s time-based trigger for fundraising did not make sense for his 
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company. Although he regretted that the company would not be able to take advantage of 
the publicity and access that Investor Day would provide, the CEO thought that twelve 
weeks was not enough time for his company to gain traction:  
We would have liked to kick off our fundraising on Investor Day because that 
would have been better, but…we are not as far along for that to make sense for us. 
We’re kind of taking it slow… We want to get some traction before we actually go 
out to investors. 
 
In sum, the founders in this second subset of companies lessened their feelings of 
asynchrony by choosing to pay attention to only one of those triggers: the event-based 
trigger that dictated a particular sequence of work activities (i.e., traction before 
fundraising). In contrast to the entrepreneurs who lived with the asynchrony, these 
entrepreneurs did not accept InnoTech’s claim that acceleration would guarantee funding 
success at the end of the twelve-week program. Instead, they assumed that no matter how 
intensely they worked during the program, they would not be ready to approach investors 
within the timeframe set by InnoTech. 
 
TEMPORAL SYNCHRONY AND ASYNCHRONY:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR WORK 
 As Figure 4.1 illustrates, whether the entrepreneurs experienced a sense of 
synchrony or asynchrony—based on their perceptions of compatibility between the time- 
and event-based triggers for fundraising established by InnoTech—shaped how those 
founders made decisions and set priorities as they worked to build their new ventures. In 
particular, the entrepreneurs’ experiences of synchrony or asynchrony, and how they 
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coped with asynchrony, had implications for their planned timetable for fundraising as 
well as their work priorities. 
 
Timetable for Fundraising 
 Two subsets of the entrepreneurs planned to start fundraising at the end of the 
InnoTech program, in alignment with the time-based trigger of Investment Day: those 
who experienced synchrony and those who experienced asynchrony but prioritized both 
types of triggers anyway. The third subset of entrepreneurs—those who felt asynchrony 
but lessened that asynchrony by emphasizing the event-based trigger—adopted a more 
flexible approach to their plans for fundraising. 
 Synchrony: Fundraising. The entrepreneurs who experienced a sense of 
synchrony planned to start their fundraising at the end of the program, to coincide with 
Investor Day. They saw the end of the InnoTech program as the right time for them to 
seek funding, based on the twin assumptions that Investor Day should trigger their 
fundraising campaigns and that their companies would have achieved enough traction by 
then to enable them to approach investors successfully. For example, the founders of 
InfluenceX talked about preparing to launch their company’s fundraising campaign at the 
end of the program, to take full advantage of the exposure they would have on Investor 
Day. As the CEO of the company commented partway through the InnoTech program: 
“We want to have (investors) interested, either with soft commits or hard commits by the 
time we go to Investor Day. So that that helps us push more people into the (funding) 
round.” As the program ended, the InfluenceX Cofounder further explained:  
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We really wanted to nail Investor Day so we were completely focused on that... 
All the pressure was going to be when all those investors are in the room... We 
were really focused on preparing for that. 
 
Asynchrony—responding to both triggers: Fundraising. Not surprisingly, there 
were differences in fundraising timetables between the entrepreneurs who experienced a 
sense of asynchrony, based on how they coped with that asynchrony. The entrepreneurs 
who prioritized both types of triggers had timetables similar to those entrepreneurs who 
felt a sense of synchrony: they planned to begin their fundraising campaigns on Investor 
Day. The founders of VidAds, for example, talked about jumpstarting their fundraising 
efforts at that event. The Cofounder of the company remarked that he and the CEO of 
VidAds were working around the clock in the days leading up to Investor Day, trying to 
ensure that they would have “something” they could use “to get people interested or 
excited.” He explained: 
We were just really trying to get sort of a working demo-able version of the 
analytic software product that we were working on… From a fundraising 
standpoint, our big focus was how can we build a story or build investor (interest) 
around this product. 
 
Asynchrony—emphasizing the event-based trigger: Fundraising. The 
entrepreneurs who lessened the asynchrony—by emphasizing the event-based trigger but 
not the time-based trigger prescribed by the accelerator—had more flexible and 
indeterminate timetables for fundraising. These entrepreneurs knew that they would 
eventually seek funding, but were unsure exactly when they would meet with investors. 
They adopted a sequential rather than a temporal mindset to fundraising: they planned to 
approach investors when they had sufficient evidence of market validation, whenever that 
might be. In other words, these entrepreneurs chose to move toward fundraising at a pace 
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dictated by progress rather than time. For instance, the CEO of SportsNow characterized 
Investor Day as insignificant for his company because he and his Cofounder would not 
even have launched a working product by the time the event occurred: 
(Investor Day) is a chance to show people that we've met and worked with 
through the mentor network, and in our own class, and the alums, what we've 
built, what we've done in a very short amount of time. But to us as a company, I 
think it's maybe less important… Because we still are going to have six plus weeks 
of really intense work ahead of us after that day. So it's not like this big 
momentous release of our new app. It’s just kind of more of a formal status 
update.  
 
The founders of ScienceEd also did not think they would seek funding on Investor. 
The CEO remarked: “We are not expecting someone to write us a check at (Investor Day). 
It won’t happen. It will take time.... For us, it’s not as fast-paced." His Cofounder 
commented soon after the program ended: “(Investor Day) did not really mean anything 
other than it was a sort of a milestone… the program officially comes to an end, but 
really speaking, the work had just begun.” 
 
Work Priorities 
 The entrepreneurs who planned to raise money at the end of the InnoTech 
program—those who experienced synchrony and those who felt asynchrony but 
responded to both triggers—prioritized work activities aimed at gaining traction during 
the InnoTech program. As I discuss below, however, focusing on traction had different 
implications for the entrepreneurs who experienced synchrony versus those who 
perceived incompatibility but lived with their feeling of asynchrony. In contrast to both 
these subgroups of entrepreneurs, those who felt but lessened the asynchrony—and thus 
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did not intend to raise money on Investor Day—tended to prioritize work activities 
geared toward refining their business models and building their products or services. 
These differences emerged not only in terms of divergent work activities, but also in 
terms of whether the entrepreneurs adopted short- or long-term mindsets when making 
decisions about their ventures. 
Synchrony: Priorities. The entrepreneurs who experienced synchrony—that is, 
they perceived InnoTech’s timeframe as aligned with their own companies’ trajectories 
toward funding—worked primarily on getting traction during the accelerator program. In 
line with their intent to raise money at the end of the InnoTech program, the companies 
who felt a sense of synchrony focused on work activities that they thought would be most 
likely to yield interest from investors at the end of the twelve weeks. Thus they allocated 
their energy and attention to activities related to customer acquisition, and maintained 
that focus throughout the program. For instance, the founders of GameB spent their time 
trying to secure contracts with clients, so that they could announce larger customer 
numbers on Investor Day. To do this, they set up and attending many meetings with 
prospective clients. They also tried to shorten their sales cycle, so that they could close 
contracts more quickly, and thus sign up more customers before the end of the InnoTech 
program.  
The entrepreneurs working on TopHire also saw customer acquisition as the 
company’s highest priority in the weeks leading up to Investor Day. Even though the 
company was relatively early in the process of venture creation—especially compared to 
GameB—its founders devised and implemented techniques for enticing users to sign up 
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for the company’s initial, stripped-down offering. For instance, one of TopHire’s two 
Cofounders described an idea his team was trying in order to attract student users to the 
company’s website: 
Right now, we are trying to build (the site) and get some users… We launched a 
competition (which we) are going to promote to colleges, and ask them to 
compete with each other. There is a five hundred dollar cash prize… For a five 
hundred dollar cash prize, people will register. 
 
The other TopHire Cofounder commented that this competition was a way of getting “a 
lot of users into our system.” He further explained that they hoped getting more users 
would demonstrate to investors that their business model was effective: 
That might show investors that we are doing something. That people are using it. 
And it might get some traction that they would see... We are trying to have at least 
ten thousand users so that we can attract investors by the time we end this 
(program).  
 
 The entrepreneurs who experienced synchrony generally entered the InnoTech 
program with the intent of fundraising, and thus they were already planning to spend their 
time in the program focusing on work activities that would help them attract investors. 
Their goals—framed in terms of getting customers to demonstrate traction—thus 
remained fairly consistent throughout the course of the program. Furthermore, their short- 
and long-term priorities tended to be well aligned: they saw achieving the objectives they 
set for Investor Day as helping them progress toward their ultimate goals of building 
sustainable, successful companies. For instance, the founders of GameB saw growing 
their customer base while they were in the InnoTech program as both a way of taking 
advantage of the short-term, specific opportunity afforded by Investor Day and of making 
progress in their broader plans to grow and secure funding for their company. As the 
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CEO of the company stated: “As we moved along (through the program), we made sure 
that we did not lose our focus (on customers and funding).”  
 Asynchrony—responding to both triggers: Priorities. Like the entrepreneurs who 
felt a sense of synchrony, those who experienced and lived with a sense of asynchrony 
wanted to get traction during the InnoTech program, hoping to attract investors on 
Investor Day. However, unlike the entrepreneurs who perceived compatibility between 
the time- and event-based triggers set by InnoTech, those who responded to both triggers 
were pulled by the competing priorities and time horizons suggested by each trigger. 
Although they felt pushed to focus on getting traction in the short-term, because of the 
Investor Day time-based trigger, they also saw the need to engage in activities that, 
although unlikely to yield traction by the end of the program, were important in terms of 
building a successful new company in the longer-term.  
As the entrepreneurs in this subset of companies struggled with these competing 
priorities, they found that they could not afford to spend much time on anything unrelated 
to traction if they wanted to be ready to approach investors on Investor Day. Although 
they recognized that focusing on traction meant compromising or sacrificing other 
aspects of their ventures, they ultimately made choices that they believed would enable 
them to meet both the temporal and the sequential requirements for fundraising: they 
focused on gaining customers.  
For these entrepreneurs, the tension between longer- and shorter-term thinking—
and the movement toward a twelve-week mindset—was evident, in different ways, 
throughout the program. At the start of the program, when InnoTech asked them to set 
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goals for the twelve weeks, the entrepreneurs in this subgroup of companies set goals 
with Investor Day in mind, even though they were often aware that those goals did not 
necessarily align with their longer-term objectives. For instance, the founders of PlayBox 
said that they established goals for their company based on what they thought would 
impress investors on Investor Day. As the CEO explained: 
InnoTech kind of framed (it) this way… ‘When you're standing on that stage in 
three months... What are some things you want to have achieved?’ And then frame 
it such that it’s like, ‘Well, we've reached this many more people, we’ve signed up 
this many (customers)’ … So frame (the goals) in these ways, literally things you 
want to verbally say… So that’s how we came up with these goals. 
 
Even though PlayBox chose goals that revolved around customer acquisition targets, its 
founders realized that these goals did not reflect the most pressing priorities for creating 
their venture. The CEO commented: 
 The goals (we set) weren’t really goals, they were more like achievements… It 
was more like things you would show off with rather than things that would really 
help your business behind the scenes. It was less like really become clear on why 
you’re doing this, or really become clear on your product. Because that’s a hard 
thing to announce (to investors). 
 
 For some companies, the tension between doing what was most important for the 
longer-term success of the businesses and preparing for Investor Day in the shorter-term 
surfaced partway through the program, in the form of significant shifts in the 
entrepreneurs’ strategies. In these cases, as the program progressed, the entrepreneurs 
began to fear that their plans for achieving traction were unrealistic, given how little 
progress they had made to date. Feeling constrained by the timing of Investor Day, they 
devised new approaches for signing up customers, instead of continuing to work 
according to their original plans, even if they believed that those plans supported their 
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longer-term business objectives. For instance, some of the entrepreneurs with consumer-
targeted businesses stopped trying to gain “real” customers and instead turned to signing 
up friends and family members, so that they could announce higher user numbers on 
Investor Day. They knew that these were temporary customers that they were using to 
bolster their companies’ images, and that they would still need to secure actual customers 
later on. 
In some cases, strategy shifts partway through the program meant not just 
thinking differently about how to gain traction, but making changes to the actual business. 
For example, the founders of VidAds decided to build and get users for a separate side 
product in the remaining weeks of the program, rather than continuing trying to close 
contracts for their core product. They saw this as a more realistic way of demonstrating 
traction by Investor Day, because, unlike their core enterprise-focused product, the new 
side product was consumer-oriented. As the CEO of VidAds explained, he and his 
Cofounder believed that the sales cycles for their enterprise product was too long for 
them to close contracts by the end of the InnoTech program; they hoped, however, that 
they could get enough consumer users for their new product within the last few weeks of 
the program to demonstrate traction: 
Sales cycles (for our core enterprise product) are six months. And so (VidAds) is 
not going to be able to close clients in twelve weeks… So we’re trying to launch a 
(new product)… We have more control over this…. We still need to get more 
customers signed up (for our main product), but it’s not going to happen by 
Investor Day. 
 
The entrepreneurs working on VidAds made the decision to shift gears based on feeling 
pushed to be ready to approach investors at the time set by InnoTech. As the CEO 
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acknowledged, they still wanted to work on getting more customers for their core 
business, but—squeezed by the timeframe of the InnoTech program—they temporarily 
abandoned their long-term plans and core product, in favor of finding a faster way to 
show investors that they had made progress.  
 Towards the end of the program, the tension between longer-term objectives and 
impressing the audience on Investor Day, in the short-term, was visible in terms of the 
small details that the entrepreneurs concentrated on during the last couple of weeks. 
Realizing that their websites and social media profiles conveyed a sense of progress (or 
lack thereof), the entrepreneurs spent time fixing bugs, adding content, and generally 
trying to make their businesses seem as polished as they could. For instance, the TixGo 
Cofounder described how he and his Cofounder cleaned up their company’s website in 
the days right before Investor Day.  
We focused just on …making the site look more professional. Focusing on (the 
site), what was at the top and the bottom about us, and Facebook, Twitter, and the 
Team… Our theory was that the investors will check out the products, but no 
matter how smart you are, there’s sort of that initial visceral reaction when you 
land on a site. Like, this is trustworthy, or this is not.  
 
The entrepreneurs undertook these tasks, even though they recognized that their time 
might be better spent elsewhere, addressing the more pressing needs of their companies. 
The TixGo CEO, for instance, admitted that his priorities during the last few days of the 
program were based on the upcoming Investor Day, not on his company’s longer-term 
objectives: 
All the decisions that we made…were done with the audience in mind, more so 
than our customers or our users or ourselves or the long-term health of our 
business. It was all about just the story that we were going to tell (on Investor 
Day)…. It's just the theater of (Investor Day), having a couple of things that you 
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can point to and say, ‘Look, we're legitimate and we've accomplished something.’ 
Even if, in another environment, without the presence of that capstone event, we'd 
probably be prioritizing things differently… You have to shift your priorities 
based on some sort of event that is coming up, but at the same time, it's definitely 
a detour relative to maybe optimal sort of allocation of our resources and what 
we're doing. 
 
Asynchrony—emphasizing the event-based trigger: Priorities. Unlike those who 
lived with the asynchrony, and responded to both triggers, the entrepreneurs who 
experienced asynchrony but lessened it—by emphasizing the event-based trigger—
focused primarily on their long-term company objectives. Anticipating that they could 
not realistically begin fundraising at the end of the accelerator program, they distanced 
themselves from the short-term mindset endorsed by InnoTech. Looking further ahead—
beyond the twelve weeks of the program—they set priorities by identifying what they 
needed to do at the moment in order to build strong, lasting businesses. These 
entrepreneurs generally chose to prioritize work activities that they believed would help 
them figure out their business models and build their products or services. They saw 
getting their business models correct early on, and creating well-tested products and 
services, as crucial for the longer-term viability of their ventures. More specifically, the 
entrepreneurs in this subgroup of companies spent their time getting feedback on their 
ideas and trying to incorporate that feedback into their businesses, rather than trying to 
gain customers for their businesses. For instance, the founders of ScienceEd described the 
InnoTech program as primarily an opportunity to figure out exactly what their product 
should be. As the Cofounder explained,  
It’s just being here, soaking up all the experiences, the feedback and just trying to 
put that into the product... (The CEO) is going and talking to people (in our 
industry)… Pretty much everybody agreed that what we’re doing is probably 
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right. It’s the right thing to do right now and maybe the approach that we are 
proposing right now also makes sense.  
 
In some cases, received advice persuaded the entrepreneurs that they needed to 
make relatively drastic changes to their business models. Although they recognized that 
making such changes would mean delaying customer acquisition, and thus funding, the 
entrepreneurs in this subgroup of companies responded to information that suggested an 
approach counter to their existing plans; they believed it was in the long-term interest of 
their ventures to get their fundamental business models right before investing time and 
energy in implementation. For example, the founders of FanCraze discovered that there 
was a major, established company that was starting to add features similar to their own 
core offering. Doubting that they would be able to compete with this company, the CEO 
and Cofounder of FanCraze decided to make a major shift, or “pivot,” in their business 
model. The Cofounder realized that this shift would mean cutting “functionality” for a 
“long time.” He commented: “It's going to be a lot of development time put into it and 
sort of revising the site.” Although he acknowledged that this meant that the company 
would be unlikely to attract investors at the end of the program, he believed it was more 
important to use the program to determine how to build the FanCraze business than it was 
to secure funding at the end of it: 
The things that we're going to get out of (the program) that aren't going to show 
up on a balance sheet or an investor deck are more valuable in the sense of 
having spent however many hours talking to different designers about how they 
think about web design and spending so many hours talking to business people 
about how they think about their business models. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The analysis presented in this chapter offers a number of contributions to the 
literature on temporality. In particular, I extend prior research by theorizing about the 
intersection between temporal and event-based pacing. I also contribute to ongoing 
conversations about entrainment theory and the implications of deadlines. 
 
Temporal and Event-based Pacing: Intersections 
As I discussed in the Introduction (Chapter 1), a number of scholars (e.g., Gersick, 
1988, 1989, 1994; Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Okhuysen, 2001; Okhuysen & Waller, 2002; 
Waller et al., 2002) have explored the phenomenon and effects of temporal pacing, in 
which time-based triggers in the environment (e.g., financial reporting periods, seasons) 
spark shifts in focus (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Gersick, 1994). This literature is grounded 
in theories of entrainment, which contend that work behavior becomes “in sync” with 
time-based triggers, or temporal pacers, that are external to the work (Ancona, Okhuysen, 
et al., 2001; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; McGrath et al., 1984; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983). 
There is also a second type of pacing, discussed earlier in this chapter, which Gersick 
(1994) identified in her study of a new venture: event-based, wherein specific events (e.g., 
finding a location for a new store, securing an advisor for a new company) permit and 
catalyze the initiation of new activities or tasks. Although temporal and event-based 
pacing are distinct concepts, Gersick proposed that “situations that entail only one or the 
other are probably rare,” and thus researchers should “consider how temporal and event-
based pacing interact” (1994: 41). More recently, Ancona and Waller echoed Gersick, 
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pointing out that, although the different pacing types have usually been examined 
separately, “researchers (have) not…juxtaposed the simultaneous effects…in one study” 
(2007: 116).  
As my data collection and analysis evolved, I realized that InnoTech offered an 
ideal opportunity to understand what happens at the intersection of temporal and event-
based pacing, given that the accelerator established triggers that generated conditions of 
both types of pacing. In this chapter, I unpacked how the entrepreneurs at InnoTech 
experienced and responded to InnoTech’s imposition of both types of triggers for 
fundraising. In line with Gersick’s suggestion that “serious tension may occur…when 
both time limits and outcome specifications are important” (1994: 41), I found that the 
coexistence of both forms of pacing created a potential paradox for the entrepreneurs: 
whereas the time-based trigger—Investor Day, scheduled at the end of the twelve-week 
accelerator program—stipulated that the entrepreneurs should move to a different activity 
(i.e., fundraising) at a specific point in time, the event-based trigger—gaining traction to 
demonstrate market validation to investors—required that the entrepreneurs achieve a 
specific milestone before moving to that activity.  
Differing perceptions of pacing. My analysis also highlights that an 
organization’s members may perceive the coexistence of temporal and event-based 
pacing in varying ways, as more or less conflicting. Although some of the entrepreneurs 
saw InnoTech’s time- and event-based triggers for fundraising as incompatible, others 
saw the two types of triggers as compatible. By revealing and exploring these variations 
in perception, I provide empirical evidence to support theories about how—and why—
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temporal elements of an organization may be viewed differently by different members of 
that organization. Blount & Janicik (2001) propose that each organizational member has 
a “prevailing temporal agenda,” defined as that person’s “perception and construal of a 
temporal structure from his or particular vantage point within the firm” (570). Similarly, 
Bluedorn and Standifer (2006) posit that some individuals have a greater degree of 
“temporal imagination,” or ability to understand the intersection of their own “timescapes” 
(Adam, 1998)—temporal elements of their personal and group work contexts—with the 
broader “timescape” of their organization. Finally, Waller and her colleagues (Waller, 
Conte, Gibson, & Carpenter, 2001) found that individual-level differences in time 
urgency (a central component of the Type A behavior pattern) and time perspective (i.e., 
past, present, or future orientation) shaped people’s perceptions of deadlines in 
significant ways.  
In keeping with this prior work, I found that the entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the 
simultaneous presence of time- and event-based triggers were influenced by their 
conceptualizations of a key temporal element at InnoTech, Investor Day: whereas some 
entrepreneurs accepted Investor Day as a meaningful time-based trigger, and thus strove 
to start fundraising at that event, others deemphasized Investor Day, disassociating it 
from their companies’ plans for beginning fundraising. These divergent interpretations of 
Investor Day were shaped strongly by the entrepreneurs’ embeddedness in their 
respective companies, each of which faced a distinct set of challenges and opportunities. 
This finding underscores that an organization’s temporal elements may have different 
meanings for different people, depending on that person’s work context (i.e., unique 
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individual and/or team situation). 
Impact on experience. This chapter also offers insights into why people may 
experience positive and/or negative emotions when working under conditions of temporal 
pacing. According to the extant literature, acceleration tactics such as deadlines may 
spark motivation (Gersick, 1989; Locke & Latham, 2002; Locke et al., 1981), but can 
also create feelings of anxiety or stress (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983; Nicholson, 2000; 
Williams & Alliger, 1994). The findings presented above suggest that emotional 
reactions to temporal pacing may be shaped, at least in part, by the simultaneous presence 
of event-based pacing: if people perceive time-based triggers as incompatible with event-
based triggers in their work environments, they may be more likely to experience anxiety 
or stress. In contrast, if they perceive the two types of triggers as compatible, they may be 
more likely to feel motivated under conditions of temporal pacing. 
Impact on the work. The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that people’s 
differing perceptions of the interactions between temporal and event-based pacing have 
important implications for how they approach their work. At InnoTech, the entrepreneurs’ 
perceptions of whether or not the two types of triggers—time- and event-based—were 
compatible played a significant role in terms of their work plans and priorities. My 
findings suggest that when people view the two types of triggers as compatible, they tend 
to make decisions and set priorities without feeling as though they must choose between 
near- and longer-term objectives. In contrast, if people see the two types of triggers as 
incompatible, they tend to make decisions and set priorities amidst a sense of conflict, 
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feeling they must sub-optimize either their short-term goals or their longer-term 
objectives.  
Multiple ways of coping with asynchrony. My analysis also reveals that people 
may avoid perceived compromises between short- and longer-term objectives by—in the 
face of perceived incompatibility between time- and event-based triggers—eliminating, 
in effect, one of the triggers from their work contexts. That is, they may lessen their sense 
of asynchrony by discounting, or ignoring, one of the triggers present in their 
environment. At InnoTech, a subset of the founders lessened their feelings of asynchrony 
by emphasizing the event-based trigger, at the expense of the time-based one. These 
entrepreneurs proceeded with a temporally flexible mindset, expecting to approach 
investors when their work accomplishments indicated it was time to do so.  
Interestingly, I did not see evidence during the program of entrepreneurs 
prioritizing the time-based trigger over the event-based one: they either responded to both, 
or emphasized the event-based trigger. However, the interviews I conducted with the 
entrepreneurs in the two months after the program ended revealed otherwise. As the 
founders reflected on the choices they had made during the InnoTech program, it became 
clear that a number of those who had begun fundraising campaigns on Investor Day, 
despite their experiences of asynchrony, had actually discounted the event-based trigger 
that established a prescribed order of activities (i.e., traction before fundraising). In the 
weeks following the program, they had concluded that they had started fundraising too 
soon, before they had sufficient traction to attract investors. This realization was based 
primarily on a lackluster response from investors, in the form of feedback that the 
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companies were not yet ready for funding. Thus these companies had suspended their 
fundraising efforts indefinitely. They planned to resume fundraising once they had 
achieved greater traction in the market.  
Taken together, the data collected during and after the program suggest that 
people may in fact cope with the asynchrony created by the coexistence of time- and 
event-based triggers by emphasizing one or the other type of trigger, with differing 
implications for work outcomes. The entrepreneurs who abandoned the notion of Investor 
Day as the official start of their fundraising campaigns adhered closely to the prescribed 
sequence, delaying fundraising until they had achieved more traction. In contrast, those 
who remained wedded to the idea of Investor Day as the required time to initiate 
fundraising often found that they had rushed to start fundraising, forcing a shift for which 
their companies were not yet really ready. 
These findings are in line with Ancona and Waller’s (2007) study of teams 
working in the context of temporal and event-based pacing (as well as in the presence of 
unexpected external “jolts”). They found that five teams, within the same organization, 
emphasized the multiple types of pacers in their environment in varying ways: although 
all the teams made changes to their work strategies in response to each type of pacer (as 
well as in reaction to unpredicted external “jolts”), each team emphasized one type of 
pacer more than the others. For instance, one team tended to alter its work strategy when 
it completed a project phase, whereas another team generally aligned such changes with 
cyclical customer demand rhythms. 
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Entrainment Theory in Organizations 
As I explained earlier in this chapter, as well as in the Introduction (Chapter 1), 
entrainment theory suggests that people’s behavior comes to be “in sync” with temporal 
pacers, or time-based triggers, in the environment (Ancona, Okhuysen, et al., 2001; 
McGrath & Kelly, 1986; McGrath et al., 1984; McGrath & Rotchford, 1983). The notion 
that temporal pacers “capture” and thus influence the timing of behavior stems from the 
theory’s origins in biology, where entrainment is used to explain the “syncing” of 
physiological processes with rhythms in the environment (e.g., circadian rhythms) 
(McGrath & Rotchford, 1983). Outside of biology, organizational scholars have 
developed explanations for why people “sync” their work behavior with exogenous 
pacers. Most notably, Blount and her colleagues (Blount & Janicik, 2002; Leroy, Shipp, 
Blount, & Licht, 2015) have argued that people have an innate need to align their 
behavior with temporal pacers, because doing so generates positive emotions and a sense 
of well-being. Their work builds on that of McGrath, Kelly, and Machatka (1984), who 
proposed that compatibility between individual and work environment rhythms influence 
affect and cognition. It is also supported by empirical evidence from Jansen and Kristof-
Brown’s study (2005) of a furniture company: they found that individuals whose pace of 
work was congruent with the pace of their work group enjoyed less strain and higher 
levels of satisfaction.  
In contrast to these existing theories of entrainment in organizations—which 
suggest that people are driven to “sync” their behavior with rhythms in their environment 
(Blount & Janicik, 2002; Jansen & Kristof-Brown, 2005; Leroy et al., 2015; McGrath et 
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al., 1984)—I found that some of the entrepreneurs at InnoTech coped with their 
experience of asynchrony by not aligning their behavior with a key temporal pacer in 
their environment (i.e., Investor Day). This finding suggests that entrainment in 
organizations may not be a straightforward process wherein people automatically adapt 
their behavior in response to a temporal pacer. Rather, people’s responses may be more 
agentic, and thus more varied: they may react in different ways based on the meanings 
they attach and the attention they devote to a particular pacer (Blumer, 1969; Emirbayer 
& Mische, 1998; James, 1938; Mead, 1932). Adopting this more complex perspective of 
entrainment could make the theory more powerful in terms of its ability to reveal 
important insights about organizations.  
A more nuanced view of entrainment is supported not only by this dissertation 
research, but also by a few prior studies that offer glimpses into the different ways in 
which people may resist temporal control. Fine (1990: 102) found that restaurant cooks 
sometimes decoupled their work pace from managers’ orders—which were linked to 
rhythms of customer demand—in order to create “temporal niches” wherein they could 
recuperate and reenergize: 
Frequently cooks will joke, sing, or even play catch with steaks while they 
prepare food, recognizing that they are not working at their peak speed… They 
will collectively stop work for a few minutes, willing to take the consequences of 
their tardiness. These techniques provide evidence to the cooks that they do 
maintain some measure of control over time.  
 
In his classic study of a garment factory, Roy (1960) observed that machine operators 
responded to the long, monotonous hours of work imposed by management by 
developing a series of informal, shared breaks. Perlow (1998) identified two different 
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types of responses to managers’ efforts to control the boundary between work and other 
life domains: one group of employees (the “acceptors”) prioritized work over all other 
aspects of their lives, while another group (the “resisters”) made themselves unavailable 
at certain times. Finally, Mazmanian (2013) found that smartphones were adopted in 
divergent ways by lawyers and sales representatives within the same firm. The lawyers 
developed homogenous practices—which they experienced as a form of temporal 
control—that required constant availability. In contrast, the sales representatives 
developed heterogeneous practices that permitted individuals to use their devices in 
different ways. These heterogeneous practices were experienced as a form of freedom 
rather than control. 
 
Deadlines and Strategic Shifts 
The analysis presented in this chapter expands our understanding of the strategic 
shifts that people make in response to deadlines. Prior studies have found that teams alter 
their approaches to a task in order to complete that task in the time allowed. Perhaps most 
well known in this body of research is Gersick’s (1988, 1989) studies of the “midpoint 
transition”: she found that teams altered how they approached their work when they 
realized that half their allotted time had passed. The midpoint served as “an alarm clock, 
heightening members' awareness that their time (was) limited, stimulating them to 
compare where they (were) with where they need(ed) to be and to adjust their progress 
accordingly” (Gersick, 1988: 34). Although more recent research has questioned whether 
shifts in strategy always occur at the midpoint (Lim & Murnighan, 1994; Parks & Cowlin, 
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1995; Waller et al., 2002), these studies support Gersick’s (1988) central finding that 
attention to time increases as deadlines draw near, driving changes in work strategy.  
Building on the research summarized above, this chapter adds two layers of 
complexity to our understanding of the effect of deadlines on work strategies. First, my 
analysis suggests that deadlines in and of themselves do not necessarily drive changes in 
work strategy. Rather, in order for deadlines to spark strategy shifts, people need to 
accept those deadlines as meaningful, and respond accordingly. At InnoTech, some 
entrepreneurs—in reaction to the incompatibility they perceived between the event- and 
time-based triggers mandated by the accelerator—chose to discount Investor Day as a 
true deadline. Thus, even though they were aware that the time they had left until 
Investor Day was steadily waning, they did not alter their work strategies significantly in 
service of preparing for that event. This finding is in line with a constructivist perspective 
on time (e.g., Bergson, 1971; Dubinskas, 1988b; Flaherty, 2002; Hassard, 2002; Mead, 
1932). Scholars who embrace this perspective suggest that imposed deadlines are subject 
to interpretation by organizational members (McGrath & Rotchford, 1983).  
Second, this chapter calls into question whether shifts in work strategy are 
necessarily beneficial. Although previous research implies that such shifts are useful 
because they enable people to complete tasks by imposed deadlines (Gersick, 1988, 1989, 
1994), my findings suggest that deadline-driven shifts in strategy may not always support 
the longer-term objectives of ongoing work. Unlike the field and laboratory subjects in 
prior research, who were working on bounded, discrete tasks, the entrepreneurs at 
InnoTech were engaged in work that did not end on Investor Day; although InnoTech 
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framed Investor Day as a deadline, the companies’ work extended well beyond the end of 
the accelerator program. My study thus permits a richer understanding of the role and 
effects of deadline-driven strategy shifts in the context of continuing work. More 
specifically, my findings suggest that people may perceive deadline-driven shifts in 
strategy as suboptimal in the context of the longer-term outcomes they are pursuing, even 
though they see the shifts as necessary in the short-term because of the time constraints 
they face. For example, as described above, the founders of VidAds altered their 
company’s strategy partway through the InnoTech program: they moved from seeking 
customers for their core enterprise product to building and seeking users for a separate 
side consumer product, primarily because it was too difficult for them to secure enterprise 
customers by the end of the twelve-week InnoTech program. However, they later 
concluded that this shift had not been in the company’s best interests. As the CEO 
remarked a couple of months after the program ended: “We still don't have any f****** 
clients (for our core product)… We just haven't solved that problem. That’s a source of 
frustration. It's a big source of frustration because that's our job.” 
The notion that deadline-driven strategic shifts may not support longer-term 
objectives is supported by the literature on new product development. Scholars in this 
area suggest that time pressure often pushes people to adjust their work processes in ways 
that are detrimental to the success of the new product (Chen et al., 2012; Crawford, 1992; 
Lukas et al., 2002). In particular, these scholars argue that deadlines force people to move 
too rapidly, or even skip, the early steps of product development. They contend that these 
strategies lead to higher overall development costs, because problems emerge later on, 
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when they are more expensive and complicated to address (Crawford, 1992; Lukas et al., 
2002).  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
In this dissertation, I set out to understand what happens when organizations 
pursue an accelerated pace of work. To this end, I conducted an ethnographic study of a 
seed accelerator, InnoTech. My findings, which emerged from an inductive process of 
data analysis, illuminate InnoTech’s approach to acceleration—which involved a broad 
set of tactics designed to speed up funding—and how that approach shaped the 
experiences and work of the entrepreneurs participating in the accelerator program. By 
focusing on the localized meaning and implementation of acceleration at InnoTech, I 
demonstrate that although acceleration is a concept embraced by many organizations 
(Albert & Bell, 2002; Perlow et al., 2002), it is a situated phenomenon: it may be 
conceptualized and operationalized differently depending on the setting. Furthermore, I 
show that the specific way in which an organization enacts acceleration has important 
implications for how its members respond. 
In this concluding chapter, I summarize, integrate, and build on the findings 
presented earlier (in Chapters 3 and 4) to suggest broader contributions to the literature 
on acceleration. These contributions are rooted in my understanding of acceleration as an 
in situ phenomenon. I close the chapter by acknowledging the limitations of my study 
and suggesting potential avenues for future research. 
 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The broad research question I sought to answer in my dissertation was: what 
happens when organizations seek to accelerate their members’ work? I addressed this 
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broad question by considering two more specific questions, which emerged as I engaged 
with my field setting (InnoTech): how do organizations pursue acceleration? and how 
does an organization’s approach to acceleration shape its members’ experiences and 
work? In the sections below, I review the findings associated with each of these two 
questions. 
 
Localized Approach to Acceleration at InnoTech 
Considering the first key research question—how do organizations pursue 
acceleration?—led me to describe and understand the InnoTech context within which the 
entrepreneurs were embedded. To answer this question, I discussed (in Chapter 3) the 
localized meaning and implementation of acceleration that I observed at InnoTech. 
Although InnoTech could have taken any number of different approaches to accelerating 
venture creation, I found that it focused specifically on speeding up funding. This 
operationalization of acceleration had significant implications for how InnoTech directed 
and organized the entrepreneurs’ work. First, InnoTech told the entrepreneurs to devote 
their time and attention to two types of work activities that the accelerator believed would 
be most likely to lead to fundraising success: making progress on the business and 
developing stories for investors. The organization defined both of these types of activities, 
and outlined how to tackle them, for the entrepreneurs: it equated progress with gaining 
traction (i.e., acquiring customers), and required that the entrepreneurs convey their 
investor stories through standardized pitch presentations.  
Second, InnoTech employed a broad set of acceleration tactics (summarized in 
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Table 3.1) aimed at compressing traction and pitch development activities into the twelve 
weeks of its program. These tactics, which were all inherently temporal, included 
establishing a meaningful deadline (Investor Day) as well as additional practices—
amplifying the time pressure and providing concentrated resources—that were designed 
to strengthen the entraining “pull” of that deadline. This complex arsenal of tactics both 
reflected and supported InnoTech’s emphasis on speeding up funding. 
 
Implications of InnoTech’s Localized Approach to Acceleration 
The second key research question—how does an organization’s approach to 
acceleration shape its members’ experiences and work?—led me to explore the 
complicated and varied ways in which the entrepreneurs responded to InnoTech’s 
approach to acceleration. As I explained in Chapter 4, I found that InnoTech established 
potentially conflicting triggers for fundraising. On one hand, through its acceleration 
tactics, InnoTech set a time-based trigger (Gersick, 1994): it mandated that the 
entrepreneurs seek funding on Investor Day, at the end of the program. On the other hand, 
InnoTech stipulated a particular sequence of work: the Management Team told the 
entrepreneurs that they needed to make progress on their businesses, in the form of 
gaining traction, before asking investors for money. InnoTech thus also established a 
sequential, or event-based, trigger (Gersick, 1994) for fundraising. As Figure 4.1 depicts, 
the entrepreneurs at InnoTech perceived the presence of these two types of triggers in 
varying ways: whereas some founders saw the triggers as compatible—and thus 
experienced a sense of synchrony—others saw the triggers as incompatible—and thus 
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experienced a sense of asynchrony. The entrepreneurs who felt a sense of asynchrony 
coped with that experience in two different ways: although some lived with the 
asynchrony, and thus responded to both triggers, others lessened the asynchrony, by 
emphasizing the event-based trigger (i.e., they prioritized sequence over pace).  
The subgroup of entrepreneurs who experienced a sense of synchrony planned to 
begin fundraising at the end of the accelerator program (on Investor Day), and focused on 
getting traction—by acquiring customers—to support both their short- and long-term 
objectives. Similarly, those founders who experienced but lived with a sense of 
asynchrony planned to initiate fundraising efforts on Investor Day, and therefore 
prioritized gaining traction. However, this subset of entrepreneurs recognized that 
concentrating on traction often meant compromising their longer-term objectives in favor 
of the shorter-term goals set by InnoTech.  
Finally, the entrepreneurs who experienced but lessened their sense of asynchrony 
decided not to begin fundraising on Investor Day, although they expected to present that 
day (because participation was required by InnoTech). The entrepreneurs in this third 
group adopted a longer-term mindset, and thus tended to focus on work activities aimed 
at refining their business models and creating well-tested products. 
 
In the next section, I draw on the findings summarized above to elaborate the 
broader contributions of this dissertation. More specifically, I articulate several ways in 
which my situated perspective extends knowledge about acceleration. 
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BROADER CONTRIBUTIONS: THEORIES OF ACCELERATION  
This dissertation enriches theories of acceleration in organizations by offering a 
situated view. My findings highlight that acceleration is a localized phenomenon: it is 
enacted in varying ways depending on the setting. Furthermore, differences in meaning 
and implementation have important implications for people’s experiences and work.  
This situated perspective not only adds nuance to scholarly conceptualizations of 
acceleration, but also helps explain why prior research has yielded mixed results 
regarding the effects of greater speed. Although there is a long-held popular belief that 
faster is better (Albert & Bell, 2002; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988; Stalk & Hout, 1990; Taylor, 1911), there is mounting 
empirical evidence that acceleration is not necessarily advantageous (Chen et al., 2012; 
Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1994; Perlow et al., 2002). Considered in aggregate, studies 
(discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1) highlight that greater speed may be beneficial 
only in certain situations (Perlow et al., 2002); unlike track competitions—wherein pace 
predicts success—work outcomes may or not be improved through acceleration. For 
instance, Suarez and his colleagues (Suarez et al., 2015) argued that it is more effective 
for a firm to identify an appropriate time “window of opportunity” to enter an emerging 
market than it is to try to enter the market as quickly as possible. Their theorizing 
indicates that speed of market entry should depend on the unique characteristics of a 
particular firm and its target market. Similarly, research on decision-making reveals that 
faster choices may either detract from or improve decision quality, depending on the 
situation (Ben Zur & Breznitz, 1981; Blount et al., 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989; Isenberg, 
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1981; Kelly & Karau, 1999; Payne et al., 1996; Perlow et al., 2002). Scholars have also 
found that increasing the pace of work enables greater creativity in some cases, but not in 
others (Amabile, Mueller, et al., 2002; Amabile, Hadley, et al., 2002; Andrews & Farris, 
1972; Andrews & Smith, 1996). Finally, a number of studies of product development 
point toward a relationship between acceleration and performance that is tenuous and/or 
highly dependent on multiple factors (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 
1994; Ittner & Larcker, 1997; Kessler & Bierly, 2002). 
By adopting a situated perspective on acceleration, this dissertation helps explain 
these discrepant results. More specifically, my research suggests that acceleration may 
shape people’s work in different ways depending on the local context in which they are 
embedded. In particular, my findings point to the importance of the nature of the work 
being done—i.e., what an organization seeks to accelerate—as well as the timing—i.e., 
when an organization pursues acceleration.  
 
Nature of the Work 
Early theories of acceleration (e.g., Taylor, 1911) were developed in the context 
of routinized manufacturing work. Such work is characterized by predictability and 
replicability. Speeding up this type of work entails asking people to perform the same 
standardized movements, only faster. Clearly there are limits to how quickly people can 
perform their tasks well, with important implications for the balance between quality and 
quantity (Moore & Tenney, 2012). However, this balance can be understood through a 
relatively straightforward curvilinear relationship. 
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In stark contrast to manufacturing work, venture creation is fraught with 
unpredictability and novelty (Gersick, 1994; Liao et al., 2005; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; 
Morris et al., 2012; Peters et al., 2004). Therefore, speeding up this type of work is not as 
simple as following a standardized process at a more rapid pace. At InnoTech, some of 
the entrepreneurs discovered that trying to move faster—toward earlier fundraising—
altered the choices that they made about their work. In other words, rather than merely 
compressing the time they spent on a particular activity, the entrepreneurs’ efforts to 
progress rapidly actually shaped how they went about creating their ventures. A rich 
example of this, which I discussed in detail in Chapter 4, is the company VidAds. During 
the InnoTech program, the founders of this venture realized that they were struggling to 
sign up customers by the end of the twelve weeks. They thus shifted their attention to 
building and securing users for a separate side product, rather than focusing on their core 
business, as they strived to meet InnoTech’s Investor Day deadline for fundraising. 
FanCraze’s journey provides an interesting comparison. The founders of this company, 
who consciously deemphasized InnoTech’s goal of acceleration in favor of developing 
their business at their own pace, encountered information that suggested they needed to 
make a major strategic change. They decided to make this change (i.e., “pivot”), even 
though they realized that doing so would mean delaying fundraising. Whereas VidAds’ 
founders ultimately came to see acceleration as having inhibited their longer-term success, 
FanCraze’s founders perceived their avoidance of acceleration as supporting their 
company’s eventual success. 
The cases of VidAds and FanCraze offer a good opportunity for comparison, but I 
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do not wish to imply that acceleration is necessarily detrimental to new venture creation. 
Rather, these two examples highlight that entrepreneurs engaged in venture creation often 
encounter decision points that may be shaped in significant ways by pressures to 
accelerate. Recognizing this means adding nuance to our theories, and questioning 
whether imposing acceleration on certain types of work, regardless of unexpected twists 
and turns, makes sense. In making this point, I join with scholars who have studied the 
effects of time on other forms of non-routine or creative work. For instance, research has 
shown that people distribute their efforts differently—from start to deadline—depending 
on whether their work requires more or less creativity (Beeftink, 2008). In addition, 
researchers who study new product development—which is “complex and risky” (Chen 
et al., 2012: 291)—have argued that acceleration may result in poorer performance in the 
market. They contend that accelerating the process of creating and launching a new 
product often yields suboptimal outcomes because people skip or shorten critical steps, 
drop product features, fail to identify a real customer need, and settle for minimal 
innovation (Chen et al., 2012; Crawford, 1992; Lukas et al., 2002). Furthermore, these 
scholars have found that greater speed is more disadvantageous when new products 
require novel forms of technology (Allen, 1966; Chen et al., 2012; Utterback, Meyer, 
Tuff, & Richardson, 1992). Their work thus suggests, as does my study of InnoTech, that 
the specific attributes of a project or business matter in terms of how that project or 
business will be shaped by organizational mandates to accelerate. 
Considering the nature of the work also calls attention to the role of temporal 
pacing in different types of work. As discussed in several places in this dissertation, 
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temporal pacing describes when people adjust their behavior to “sync” with stimuli—
called “time givers” (Ancona & Chong, 1996) or time-based triggers (Gersick, 1994)—
present in their environment. Although time-based triggers may be present for reasons 
outside of an organization’s control (e.g., financial reporting periods set by the 
government), organizations may intentionally create time-based triggers (e.g., InnoTech’s 
Investor Day) that signal when people should complete tasks or move to the next phase of 
work (Ancona & Chong, 1996; Gersick, 1994; Okhuysen & Waller, 2002). Temporal 
pacing is at the heart of organizational attempts to accelerate members’ activities because 
it regulates work speed (Gersick, 1994). Gersick proposed that temporal pacing is most 
appropriate when work is non-routine; she argued that the pressure created by time-based 
triggers “permits and requires the use of initiative and inventiveness to solve emergent 
problems” (1994: 40). However, my dissertation research suggests that the nature of non-
routine work may be a poor match for temporal pacing. Although it is true that the 
conditions of temporal pacing at InnoTech often pushed the entrepreneurs to develop 
creative, flexible approaches to unexpected problems, those solutions did not always 
support the entrepreneurs’ longer-term objectives for their companies. In such cases, 
responding to the imposed pacing—i.e., trying to meet the deadline represented by 
Investor Day—yielded solutions that the entrepreneurs came to see as suboptimal.  
My findings thus suggest that event-based pacing—wherein the occurrence or 
achievement of one “event” triggers a shift in attention to a new task that is made more 
relevant or possible based on completing the previous task (Gersick, 1994)—may be 
better suited than temporal pacing when people are engaged in work that is unpredictable 
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and requires creativity (such as new venture creation). As Gersick herself notes, this type 
of pacing allows people to “gain the rewards of pursuing a course indefinitely, until the 
desired events indicate success” (1994: 41). The entrepreneurs at InnoTech who 
discounted the time-based trigger of Investor Day were, in effect, operating under 
conditions of event-based pacing. As my analysis reveals, these individuals generally 
planned to begin fundraising at an undetermined future time, when they had made enough 
progress to persuade investors. Furthermore, event-based pacing may be appropriate 
when work involves a sequence of steps that cannot be inverted. Some types of work 
require that activities happen in a strict sequential order, whereas others do not (Albert, 
2013; Ancona, Okhuysen, et al., 2001). By InnoTech’s own admission, the entrepreneurs 
needed to gain traction before approaching investors. This immutable sequence seems 
more in line with event-based than temporal pacing. 
In reality, most work settings are characterized by both temporal and event-based 
pacing (Ancona & Waller, 2007; Gersick, 1994) because organizations—especially those 
in dynamic environments—face fundamental tensions between efficiency and flexibility 
(Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010). However, organizations differ in the extent to 
which each type of pacing is made salient. There are thus opportunities for organizations 
to think more carefully about which form of pacing should take precedence for their 
members, depending on the nature of those members’ work.  
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Timing 
Independent of the nature of the work (e.g., product development versus 
consulting), there may be times over the course of a particular project or life of a business 
when emphasizing greater speed is beneficial, and times when acceleration is 
counterproductive. Although all of the entrepreneurs I studied at InnoTech were in the 
early stages of venture creation, their companies varied in terms of what their founders 
had already accomplished. As I noted earlier, these differences did not seem to determine 
whether the entrepreneurs perceived compatibility or incompatibility between the time- 
and event-based triggers for fundraising stipulated by InnoTech. However, after the 
entrepreneurs’ graduated from InnoTech, and reflected on their experiences, many made 
retrospective remarks about the timing of the accelerator program relative to their 
companies’ life cycles. More specifically, many of the entrepreneurs concluded that they 
should have delayed attending the InnoTech program until after their companies were 
more developed. For example, the Cofounder of VidAds stated that his company had 
been too early stage to reap the benefits of InnoTech’s focus on accelerating funding: “I 
feel like (we) didn't make the most of InnoTech because we were (still) busy trying to 
build stuff.”  
Some of the entrepreneurs also made generalized comments about the “right” 
timing for participating in a seed accelerator program such as InnoTech’s. Their 
comments, like those presented above, revealed retroactive beliefs that acceleration was 
more appropriate after, rather than before, companies had products in the market. For 
instance, the Cofounder of TixGo mused, in his final interview with me: “I think (doing 
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the program) does make sense for the people that already have their product out there”. 
He then explained that, for companies that did not yet have products, trying to accelerate 
funding did not make sense, because focusing on gaining traction (i.e., getting users) 
prior to having a product that people could use, was illogical. Similarly, the Cofounder of 
VidAds advised: “Don't go (to InnoTech) if you're at a point where you really need to 
develop your product. Go at a point where you more or less have a product ready, and 
then you can go do stuff with it.” 
The entrepreneurs’ statements about the significance of timing support my own 
observations: even among the entrepreneurs who experienced synchrony, those whose 
companies were more nascent (i.e., lacked launched products or services) struggled more 
to adapt their work to InnoTech’s mandated time-based trigger. Although many of these 
entrepreneurs did not identify the earlier stage of their companies as inhibiting their 
ability to meet the temporal demands imposed by the accelerator during the program, 
their reflective interview remarks indicate that this became evident to them once they had 
left the program. 
 In sum, for the population of entrepreneurs at InnoTech, acceleration appeared to 
be more helpful for companies who had already launched products or services. In 
promoting this perspective—that acceleration is more or less effective depending on the 
phase of a project or business—I build on two scholars’ prior work on nascent ventures 
and projects. First, in their study of a new technology company, Perlow and her 
colleagues (Perlow et al., 2002) found that speeding up decision-making was effective 
initially but later contributed to poor outcomes. Second, Crawford (1992) proposed that 
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certain phases of product development are better suited to acceleration than others. He 
argued that the earliest phase of product development is affected adversely by a focus on 
greater speed, because that phase requires work—ideation and establishing a clear 
vision—that cannot be compressed into a short, pre-determined timeframe: 
To save time, we either have to make the target very simple (incremental 
innovation) or accept partial innovation… A push for speed early in a project 
tends to diffuse our picture of the objective—if we don’t take the time to make it 
clear, requirements will change constantly under pressure, and scientists and 
engineers will have to shoot at moving targets. (194) 
 
My findings add support to this previous empirical (Perlow et al., 2002) and conceptual 
(Crawford, 1992) work, pointing toward timing as a key element that should be 
considered when theorizing acceleration, and deciding what type of pace is appropriate in 
a given situation. 
 
 Although the preceding sections argue that is important to take both the nature of 
the work and timing into account, it is important to note that identifying when and where 
acceleration is appropriate is far more complex than plugging variables such as the 
degree of innovation required and project stage into an equation. As my findings 
demonstrate, acceleration tactics such as those employed by InnoTech have complex 
implications for people’s work. Furthermore, such tactics may simultaneously influence 
work in positive and negative ways: even though acceleration may encourage suboptimal 
decisions—as was the case for the entrepreneurs who experienced asynchrony yet still 
tried to respond to both the time- and event-based triggers imposed by InnoTech—time 
constraints are often an effective way of motivating people to work harder or think more 
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creatively (Freedman & Edwards, 1988; Gersick, 1988, 1989; Locke et al., 1981). 
Therefore, it would be difficult to determine whether focusing on greater speed is 
completely appropriate or inappropriate in a given situation. However, having a more 
nuanced understanding of the ways in which acceleration may influence not only what 
work gets done, but how that work gets done, can help organizations make more 
informed, tailored choices. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 Ethnographic studies yield rich data that are well-suited to theory building (Patton, 
2002), which was the goal of this dissertation, and to understanding temporal concepts in 
specific, localized settings (Dubinskas, 1988b). However, this methodology has several 
limitations, each of which suggests a potential future avenue of research.  
First, InnoTech operationalized acceleration in a specific, localized way. 
Theorizing the meaning and implementation of acceleration at InnoTech is a central 
contribution of this dissertation: I showed that InnoTech’s chosen focus on earlier 
funding shaped the entrepreneurs’ experiences and work in significant ways. Other 
organizations—including other accelerators—view and enact acceleration in different 
ways. My research indicates that these varying approaches might have different 
implications for people’s experiences and work. Additional investigation of acceleration 
in other settings could help describe these approaches to acceleration, and pinpoint 
whether they yield similar or divergent findings. One possible study setting would be an 
accelerator that does not emphasize fundraising: such forms are currently emerging in the 
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accelerator landscape, as entrepreneurs are increasingly questioning the funding-focused 
model that has, to date, been dominant.  
Second, I selected InnoTech as a research setting because I was interested in 
acceleration. However, as noted in the Introduction (Chapter 1), speed does not 
necessarily imply a faster pace. Organizations may also intentionally pursue a slower 
speed. My research suggests that—just as there are differences in terms of organizational 
approaches to acceleration—deceleration may be enacted in varying ways depending on 
the specific setting. By studying localized approaches to deceleration, future studies 
could build on the situated perspective developed in this dissertation, and help identify 
when and where it may be more appropriate to move slowly rather than quickly. Possible 
sites for exploring deceleration include “slow fashion” companies—which emphasize the 
importance of sustainable production processes—and mindfulness training programs—
which teach people to ignore the passage of “clock time” in favor of focusing on the 
“present moment”. 
Third, ethnographies yield rich insights that are grounded in a particular 
population of participants (Patton, 2002). Although these insights are at the heart of my 
dissertation, the findings from my research—developed based on a study of a specific 
group of entrepreneurs—may not generalize to other populations. I expect that the 
entrepreneurs at InnoTech were similar to other people engaged in new venture creation, 
as well as similar forms of creative or knowledge work. However, it is possible that there 
were unique aspects of the population that I studied, and these aspects may have 
influenced my findings in important ways. Additional studies of other populations 
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working under conditions of mandated acceleration could identify such aspects, and 
uncover how these aspects might be meaningful in terms of how greater speed shapes 
people’s experiences and work. Such future research would not only help establish the 
generalizability of my findings, but also enrich understanding of the situated nature of 
acceleration. 
Fourth, InnoTech and the companies participating in its program permitted me 
unusually broad access: whereas accelerators often resist researcher access—because 
they do not want to introduce distractions into an already intense environment—I was 
able to observe and learn about the entrepreneurs’ work experiences and activities 
throughout each session of the InnoTech program that I studied. However, although I 
observed the entrepreneurs continually throughout each session, I was able to interview 
the entrepreneurs only twice (once during the program, and once after the program). It is 
therefore possible that I missed or was not made aware of key occurrences or changes 
that were relevant to my research questions. A follow-on study—if the organization 
would permit a more intrusive approach—could incorporate regular diaries (or a similar 
tracking method) to gather even more comprehensive data about the entrepreneurs’ 
evolving experiences and thoughts. 
 
In conclusion, this dissertation contributes to theories of acceleration by 
examining what happens when an organization mandates a more rapid pace of work. My 
findings illuminate the complex set of tactics that organizations use to control the pace of 
work, and how these tactics shape organizational members’ experiences and work. More 
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broadly, this research points to the importance of considering speed—whether faster or 
slower—as a situated, localized phenomenon. Adopting this perspective furthers 
knowledge of the varying ways in which organizations conceptualize and operationalize 
speed. Furthermore, this perspective builds a foundation for developing a more nuanced 
understanding of when, and where, a particular pace of work is appropriate. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1. Description of Mandatory Events at InnoTech 
 
Activity Description Timing 
Orientation The InnoTech Management Team 
facilitates introductions and provides 
an overview of the program. 
Takes place during the 
first day of each session. 
Mentor Speed 
Dating 
The entrepreneurs talk to forty 
different mentors, in rapid (twenty-
minute), back-to-back meetings. 
Takes place over five half 
days, during the first two 
weeks of each session. 
Partner Meetings  The entrepreneurs meet (for thirty 
minutes) with their assigned 
InnoTech Lead Partners. 
Take place once every 
week throughout each 
session. 
Dinner/Breakfast 
Sessions 
The entrepreneurs gather to get 
feedback on their investor stories 
(pitches) and listen to a guest 
speaker. 
Take place biweekly, 
beginning in the third 
week of each session. 
Open House The entrepreneurs deliver short pitch 
presentations in front of a “friendly” 
crowd (e.g., friends/family, InnoTech 
community members). 
Takes place during the 
sixth week of each 
session. 
Investor Day The entrepreneurs deliver longer 
pitch presentations to a small group 
of invited investors. 
Takes place during the last 
week of each session. 
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Table 2.2. Summary of Data Collected 
 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Study Total  
Observation 76 hours (13 days) 
 
Observed 
individual/group 
activities in 
common area, 
shadowed 2 teams 
(1 day each) 
333 hours (43 days) 
 
Observed 
individual/group 
activities in common 
area, shadowed 4 
teams (at least 
several hours each 
week) 
409 hours (56 days) 
 
Observed 
individual/group 
activities in common 
area, shadowed 6 teams 
 
Fieldnotes: ~800 pages 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
5 interviews 
 
3 entrepreneurs, 2 
alumni 
entrepreneurs 
52 interviews 
 
27 entrepreneurs 
(midpoint), 19 
entrepreneurs (post-
program)7, 6 
InnoTech team 
members 
57 interviews 
 
49 entrepreneurs (mid- 
and post-program), 2 
alumni entrepreneurs, 6 
InnoTech team members 
 
Transcripts: ~1,600 
pages 
Program 
reflections 
N/A 6 reflections 
 
6 entrepreneurs  
6 reflections 
 
4 written responses, 2 
transcribed 
conversations 
Archival 
documents 
Over 70 documents, including emails, tweets, blog posts, and press 
coverage 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 I interviewed twenty-seven entrepreneurs at the program midpoint. I re-interviewed nineteen of 
those entrepreneurs after the program ended. (The remaining eight entrepreneurs did not respond 
to my requests for a second interview.) 
 
	  	  
125 
Table 2.3. Summary of Study Sample 
 
Participants Phase/Session 1 Phase/Session 2 Study Total  
Entrepreneurs 25 (13 companies) 30 (15 companies) 55 (28 companies) 
InnoTech Alumni 4 (4 companies) N/A 4 (4 companies) 
Management Team 6 6 68 
TOTAL 35 36 65 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Members of InnoTech Management Team remained constant across the two phases of the study. 
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Table 2.4. Detailed Listing of Companies, Entrepreneurs, and Data Collected 
 
Company9 # Entrepreneurs Access Level Data Collected 
Study Phase 1 
AcaSearch 2 Full General observation, team 
shadowing, 1 interview (CEO) 
AdHelp 1 Base General observation 
CarConnect 3 Base General observation 
Content.ly 2 Base General observation 
FavEat 3 Base General observation 
KidMonitor 2 Base General observation 
MedWeb 2 Full General observation, team 
shadowing, 1 interview (CEO) 
OutLearn 2 Base General observation 
PedalRight 2 Base General observation 
RacketConnect 1 Mid General observation, 1 
interview (CEO) 
SiteMaker 2 Base General observation 
SmartStore 2 Base General observation 
TripShare 1 Base General observation 
Study Phase 2 
CodeJob 210 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
interviews (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
ClothYo 1 Mid General observation, 1 midpoint 
interview (CEO) 
FanCraze 2 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
and 2 final interviews (CEO and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 All company names are pseudonyms, to protect confidentiality. 
10 The original CEO left the company, and thus InnoTech, several weeks into the program 
(leaving the Cofounder to become CEO). I collected data from this entrepreneur before he 
departed, including through an interview just after he left. 
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Cofounder) 
FotoZap 2 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
and 2 final interviews, 1 end-of-
program reflection (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
GameB 2 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
and 2 final interviews (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
InfluenceX 2 Full General observation, team 
shadowing, 2 midpoint and 2 
final interviews (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
LivePlay 211 Mid General observation, 1 midpoint 
and 1 final interview (CEO) 
Media4U 2 Base General observation, 1 end-of-
program reflection (CEO) 
PayO 2 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
interviews (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
PlayBox 2 Full General observation, team 
shadowing, 2 midpoint and 2 
final interviews (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
ScienceEd 2 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
and 1 final interview (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
SportsNow 2 Full General observation, team 
shadowing, 2 midpoint and 2 
final interviews, 1 end-of-
program reflection (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
TixGo 2 Mid General observation, 2 midpoint 
and 2 final interviews, 2 end-of-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Cofounder of LivePlay left InnoTech, but not his company, due to a family emergency that 
occurred partway through the program. I did not have a chance to interview him, but did observe 
him at work prior to his departure.  
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program reflections (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
TopHire 3 Mid General observation, 3 midpoint 
and 1 final interview, (CEO and 
2 Cofounders) 
VidAds 2 Full General observation, team 
shadowing, 2 midpoint and 2 
final interviews, 1 end-of-
program reflection (CEO and 
Cofounder) 
 
  
	  	  
129 
Table 2.5. Stratification of Entrepreneurs According to Level of Access 
 
 Phase/Session 1 Phase/Session 2 Study Total  
Base-level access12: 20  
(10 companies) 
2  
(1 company) 
22  
(11 companies) 
Mid-level access13: 1  
(1 company) 
20  
(10 companies) 
21  
(11 companies) 
Full-level access14: 4  
(2 companies) 
8  
(4 companies) 
12  
(6 companies) 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Base access: granted through general permission from InnoTech, it allowed me to be present in 
the common area. 
13 Mid access: granted by individual companies and entrepreneurs, it meant that I could interview 
and speak informally with the entrepreneurs in the common area. 
14 Full access: granted by the individual companies and entrepreneurs, it meant I could interview 
and speak informally with the entrepreneurs in the common area, as well as shadow the 
entrepreneurs in their company offices. 
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Table 3.1. Acceleration Tactics at InnoTech 
Acceleration Tactic Description Purpose of Tactic  
Establishing a meaningful deadline 
Bounding the timeframe Program limited to 
relatively short, twelve-
week period 
Generate sense of rapid pace 
and urgency 
Imbuing the timeframe 
with significance 
Investor Day event 
scheduled for end of twelve-
week period 
Make timeframe more 
weighty and meaningful by 
establishing ending event as 
best opportunity to impress 
investors 
Amplifying the time pressure 
Reminding about time Constant comments about 
rapid passage of time and 
importance of speed 
Create sense of limited time 
and urgency, maintain rapid 
pace throughout program 
Scheduling checkpoints Interim events scheduled at 
regular intervals throughout 
program 
Ensure entrepreneurs work 
on making progress and 
developing stories 
consistently throughout 
program, create sense of 
order 
Comparing to peers Opportunities facilitating 
informal comparisons, 
evaluations making explicit 
comparisons 
Generate friendly 
competition in order to 
motivate entrepreneurs to 
work more quickly 
Scolding Lecturing about poor 
performance (business or 
storytelling) 
Discourage slacking and 
create sense of urgency, 
create desire to impress 
Providing concentrated resources 
Mentoring Advice and guidance from 
Lead Partners and other 
sources 
Help entrepreneurs identify 
and remain focused on 
priorities, overcome 
obstacles, manage stress 
generated by program 
Making connections Targeted introductions and Connect entrepreneurs to 
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opportunities to network  valuable partners, mentors, 
customers, and investors 
Offering educational 
programming 
Workshops and 
presentations about various 
aspects of venture creation 
Enable learning to aid 
entrepreneurs in key areas 
of entrepreneurship 
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Table 4.1. Synchrony and Asynchrony (by Company) 
Company Synchrony/asynchrony Asynchrony Coping Strategy 
ClothYo Synchrony N/A 
GameB Synchrony N/A 
InfluenceX Synchrony N/A 
TopHire Synchrony N/A 
CodeJob Asynchrony Emphasized event-based trigger 
FanCraze Asynchrony Emphasized event-based trigger 
LivePlay Asynchrony Emphasized event-based trigger 
PayO Asynchrony Emphasized event-based trigger 
ScienceEd Asynchrony Emphasized event-based trigger 
SportsNow Asynchrony Emphasized event-based trigger 
FotoZap Asynchrony Responded to both triggers 
PlayBox Asynchrony Responded to both triggers 
TixGo Asynchrony Responded to both triggers 
VidAds Asynchrony Responded to both triggers 
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FIGURES  
Figure 2.1. Chronological Depiction of Events at InnoTech 
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Figure 4.1. Synchrony and Asynchrony at InnoTech 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Interview Protocols 
 
Alumni Interview Protocol (Study Phase 1) 
 
General Questions about Startup Company 
•  What is your title and role in your company? 
•  How many cofounders are there, besides you?  
•  Are you a first-time founder, or have you done this before? 
o If not a first-time founder, is it your first time doing an accelerator program? 
 
State of Company Prior to InnoTech 
•  How would you describe where your company was in the entrepreneurial process 
before starting InnoTech? 
•  Had you received any funding before you started InnoTech? 
 
Expectations for Accelerator Program 
•  What led to you applying to InnoTech?  
•  What did you hope to get out of InnoTech as you applied and prepared to enter? 
 
Day-to-Day Experience of the Program 
• What did a typical day at InnoTech look like for you?  
• Did you take breaks?  
• What made something a “good day”? 
• What made something a “not so good day” (“bad day”)? 
• What was the most exciting or satisfying experience you had in the program? 
• What was the most frustrating experience you had in the program? 
 
Time Experience and Usage 
• What was the best use of your time at InnoTech?  
• What was the least beneficial use of your time at InnoTech? 
• How did you define “progress”? Has this changed since you began the program? 
• Do you feel like you made progress during the program? 
• How quickly or slowly did the 12 weeks seem to be passing?  
 
Reflecting on the Program 
• Do you think the program helped you move ahead faster (“accelerate”)?  
• How did the 12-week timeline and built in events and milestones – such as the Open 
House and Investor Day – influence what you did and how you planned? 
• How have things changed since you completed the program? 
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Other 
• If you’ve founded a company before, how has the experience of going through 
InnoTech compared to your experience founding the previous company(ies)? 
• Anything else you’d like to add? 
 
 
Entrepreneur Interview Protocol (Study Phase 1) 
 
General Questions about Startup Company 
•  What is your title and role in your company? 
•  How many cofounders are there, besides you?  
•  Are you a first-time founder, or have you done this before? 
o If not a first-time founder, is it your first time doing an accelerator? 
 
State of Company Prior to InnoTech 
•  How would you describe where your company was in the entrepreneurial process 
before starting InnoTech? 
•  Had you received any funding before you started InnoTech? 
 
Expectations for Accelerator Program 
•  What led to you applying to InnoTech?  
•  What did you hope to get out of InnoTech as you applied and prepared to enter? 
 
Day-to-Day Experience of the Program 
• What does a typical day at InnoTech look like for you?  
• Do you take breaks? 
• What makes something a “good day”? 
• What makes something a “not so good day” (“bad day”)? 
• What has been the most exciting or satisfying experience you’ve had so far? 
• What has been the most frustrating experience you’ve had so far? 
 
Time Experience and Usage 
• What do you feel like has been the best use of your time so far at InnoTech?  
• What do you feel has been the least beneficial use of your time so far? 
• How do you define “progress”? Has this changed since you began the program? 
• Do you feel like you have made or are making progress? 
• How quickly or slowly does the 12 weeks seem to be passing?  
 
Reflecting on the Program 
• Do you think the program is helping you move ahead faster (“accelerate”)?  
• How does the 12-week timeline and built in events and milestones – such as the Open 
House and Investor Day – influence what you do and how you plan? 
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Other 
• If you’ve founded a company before, how has the experience of going through 
InnoTech compared to your experience founding the previous company(ies)? 
• Anything else you’d like to add? 
 
 
Entrepreneur Midpoint Interview Protocol (Study Phase 2) 
 
• How did you decide to apply to and come to InnoTech? 
• Can you walk me through the first weeks of the program, leading up to Open House?  
• Now, I want to look ahead, toward the second half of the program: 
a. What do you hope to accomplish by the end of the program?  
b. How do you feel you are doing in terms of achieving those goals? 
c. What are you doing to prepare for Investor Day? 
d. How do you feel about presenting on Investor Day? 
• Have there been any points so far that you feel like have been high points? Low 
points? 
• Is there anything else you’d like to add, that we haven’t discussed already? 
 
 
Entrepreneur Final Interview Protocol (Study Phase 2) 
 
• What was the end of the InnoTech program like for you?  
• What was your experience of Investor Day?  
• What has the transition out of the accelerator program been like for you so far? 
• What has changed for you since you finished the InnoTech program? 
• What was the most difficult aspect of the program for you? 
• What was the best (or easiest) aspect of the program for you? 
• How did the InnoTech events – such as the weekly breakfasts and dinners, the Open 
House, and Investor Day – affect how and when you did your work? 
• What was it like being part of the cohort of 15 teams? 
• What was it like working with your Lead Partner? With the other members of the 
InnoTech team? 
• With whom did you tend to share problems or concerns during the program? 
• Anything else you would like to add that we haven’t talked about already? 
• Do you think that you went through InnoTech at the right time for your company?  
• Are you glad you did the accelerator? Would you do it again if you had it to do “all 
over”? 
• You received a lot of feedback throughout the 12 weeks, whether during speed dating 
or during pitch practice/presentation rehearsals. What did you do with that feedback? 
How did you “process” it? Use it?  
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InnoTech Management Team Interview Protocol (Study Phase 2) 
 
• How did you get involved in InnoTech? What is your experience of entrepreneurship, 
either as an entrepreneur yourself or working with other entrepreneurs? 
• What do you look for in the teams you select for each session?  
• What does a “successful” team look like at the end of the 12-week program? What 
have they accomplished or done? 
• What does a “less successful” team look like at the end of the 12-week program? 
What have they accomplished or done? 
• What signs do you look for during the program that tell you whether or not a team 
will be successful? 
• What is the “secret sauce” that makes the accelerator work? In other words, what do 
you think are the key things that InnoTech does, or offers, that enable the teams to 
benefit from their InnoTech experience?  
• What do you personally do or say to create the conditions we just discussed—that is, 
the conditions that enable teams to benefit from the InnoTech program? (What is your 
role in terms of helping the teams benefit from the InnoTech program?) 
• What is the role of anxiety or pressure? Is there a relationship between 
anxiety/pressure and team success? 
• What is the role of the cohort? How do peer relationships with other founders relate 
to team success? 
• What is the logic behind the 12-week timeframe?  
• What is the role of the various events (e.g., Open House, dinner sessions, etc.)? How 
do you decide which events to plan and when they should occur? 
• What should teams ideally be doing with their time during the InnoTech program?  
• How has your thinking about what helps the teams succeed changed since you started 
running the InnoTech program? 
• Are you pleased with the results of the program? Why or why not? 
• Is there anything else you’d like to add, that we haven’t discussed already? 
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Appendix B: End-of-Program Reflection Tool 
 
Instructions: Please fill out the following questions. There are no right or wrong 
answers—whatever you think and feel is what I want to hear. The more detail the better, 
so feel free to go beyond the provided space. Your answers will be kept confidential (only 
I will see them).  
 
• How are you feeling as the InnoTech program comes to a close? What does it mean to 
you to have completed the 12 weeks? 
• What are you thinking about as the InnoTech program comes to an end? What’s “on 
your mind” right now? 
• What 1-2 words describe your experience of the InnoTech program? 
• What has changed for you over the last 12 weeks? For your business? For you 
personally? 
• What’s next for you? What do you expect to be doing over the next 4 weeks? The 
next 12 weeks? The next year? 
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